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NOTES 
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution 
On August 15, 1976, while an inadequate contingent of Detroit 
policemen remained outside, scores of youths rampaged through 
Cobo Hall, robbing and terrorizing the patrons at a rock concert.1 
City reaction was swift. The next day Mayor Coleman Young 
promulgated a strict juvenile curfew,2 which the City Council quickly 
affirmed by passage of an emergency ordinance on August 18.3 
Detroit had been plagued with substantial juvenile gang activity 
throughout the summer. In early August, amid growing pressures 
to take effective action against crime-particularly juvenile crime-
Mayor Young announced stepped-up enforcement of the existing 
curfew ordinance. 4 The Cobo Hall incident served as a catalyst for 
further action. 5 Regardless of its actual effect on the crime rate, 
the new curfew was psychologically effective as a visible sign of pub-
lic resolve to combat crime. 
The emergency ordinance enacted on August 18 made it .unlaw-
ful for any person under 18 to be on a public street, in a vacant lot, 
or at ·any other unsupervised public place between 10:00 p.m. and 
1. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 16, 1976, at lA, col. 6. Much of the source material 
for this Note comes from documents provided by and taped interviews with Detroit 
City Council President Carl Levin, Lt. Sherrill of the Detroit Police.Department, the 
City Law Department, and Robert Ostmann of the Detroit Free Press. All of this 
material is on file at the Michigan Law Review. 
2. It was unclear whether the Mayor could declare a curfew sua sponte without 
declaring a state of emergency; thus, those apprehended before the passage of the 
ordinance were not prosecuted. See Interview with Lt. Sherrill of the Detroit Police 
Department, in Detroit (Oct. 19, 1976), on file at the Michigan Law Review [here-
inafter cited as Lt. Sherrill Interview]. But see State v. Boles, S Conn. Cir. Ct. 22, 
240 A.?d 920 (1968). 
3. Emergency Ordinance _of Aug. 18, 1976, 1976 JOURNAL OF THB CITY COUNCIL 
1677-78 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE§ 36-3-1 to -2 (1964) ). 
4. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 3, 1976, at 3A, col. 7. The existing curfew ordi-
nance, DETROIT, MICH., CrrY CODE §§ 36-3-1 to -10 (1964), made it unlawful for 
minors aged 14 to 16 years to be on the streets from midnight to 6:00 a.m. (from 
1:00 a.m. on Friday and Saturday nights), and in certain public establishments from 
11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. (from midnight on Fridays and Saturdays). Slightly earlier 
times were specified for younger children. 
Suggestions that a stricter curfew be enacted were rejected in August 1976 by the 
City Council. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 6, 1976, at 4A, col. 3. 
S. See text at notes 1-3 supra. In addition to the new curfew, large numbers of 
laid-off police were immediately called back to duty and the police department was 
restructured to get more patrolmen on the streets. 
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6: 00 a.m. 6 On August 20, 197 6, the ordinance was amended to make 
clear that the exemption for minors in the company of adults ap-
plied only to those children accompanied by their parent, legal 
guardian, or other adult having care or custody of the minor.7 In 
October the curfew provisions were made permanent8 with only two 
minor changes. Sixteen- and seventeen~year olds were permitted 
to stay out until 11 :00 p.m. on Friday and Saturday, and minors 
6. Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 18, 1976, § 1, 1976 JOURNAL OF THE CllY 
COUNCIL 1677-78 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE § 36-3-1 (1964) ), 
The ordinance also made it 
unlawful for a minor to be in a theatre; moving picture show, bowling room or 
other place of amusement: (a) If such minor is under twelve years of age, be-
tween the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. (b) If such minor is twelve years 
of age and under eighteen years of age, between the hours of 9:30 p.m. and 6:00 
a.m. 
Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 18, 1976, supra, § 1, 1976 JoURNAL OF THE CI1Y 
COUNCIL 1677-78 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE§ 36-3-2 (1964)). 
At the same meeting, to aid in the enforcement of the curfew against juvenile 
gangs, § 39-1-52.3 of the_ City Code was amended to require that any person stopped 
for suspicion of criminal activity identify himself with verifiable evidence to the police 
officer. Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 13, 1976, § 1, 1976 JOURNAL OF nm C11Y 
COUNCIL 1679 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CI1Y CODE § 39-1-52.3 (1964)), This 
section on its face is not limited to juveniles, although the context of its passage and 
the content of its preamble, see DETROIT, MICH., 1976 JoURNAL OF THE CI1Y COUN-
CIL 1677-78, make clear that it was meant to deal with juvenile gangs. 
This "stop and identify" section was the primary focus of the attacks on the con-
stitutionality of the ordinance by the Detroit branch of the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) and the National Conference of Black ,Lawyers. See Letter from 
Board of Police Commissioners to Mayor Young (Oct. 13, 1976) (on file at the 
Michigan Law Review). In addition to the basic freedom of movement and equal 
protection issues, which are discussed in text at notes 20-155 infra, the ACLU was 
concerned about an invasion of the right of privacy if people were, in effect, required 
to carry written identification, and about the lack of standards for determining when 
a person could be stopped and required to identify himself. AOLU of Michigan, 
Newsletter, Fall 1976, at 4, col. 1. Moreover, the two ordinances together set up 
a Catch-22 situation that was of particular concern to the ACLU. A juvenile on 
the streets after curfew hours who is stopped by the police and requested to identify 
himself pursuant to this section has but two options. If he refuses to identify 
himself, he violates the "stop and identify" ordinance. If he does identify himself 
with one-of the standard forms of identification that indicates age, he is admitting 
to a prima facie violation of the curfew ordinance. Thus, the ACLU contended that 
the ordinances violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. 
This particular provision was, in fact, recently declared unconstitutional by the Mich-
igan Court of Appeals. In People v. De Fillippo, C.A. No. 77-20 (Mich. Ct, App. 
Dec. 6, 1977), the court found the ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague anct 
held that the search provisions violated the fourth amendment's protection against 
search without probable cause. 
7. Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 20, 1976, § 1, 1976 JOURNAL OF THE CI1Y 
CoUNCIL 1681 (amending DETROIT, MICH., CITY CoDE § 36-3-5 (1964)). The 
amendment eliminated the exceptions for children out on emergency errands and par-
ent-directed business. 
8. Permanent Ordinance of Oct. 18, 1976, § 1, 1976 JOURNAL OF THE CI1Y CouN-
CIL 2054. 
Despite some Council members' private misgivings about the effectiveness of a 
curfew or its impact on innocent youths, the permanent ordinance passed unani-
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legally employed and carrying a signed statement from their em-
ployer indicating their work hours were exempted from one hour 
before they started to work until one hour after they finished. 
The Detroit ordinance is stricter than most municipal curfews. 0 
Furthermore, the official city position was that it would be fully en-
forced.10 Actual enforcement, however, can best be characterized 
as discretionary, 11 with the pattern of enforcement reflecting the 
same concern over juvenile gangs that was the impetus for passage 
of the ordinance.12 
The Detroit ordinance, like all juvenile curfews, clearly restricts 
the mobility of minors. Its effect on individual liberty is thus direct 
and immediate. The contribution of such a law to the public welfare 
is more subtle. While most criminal laws proscribe behavior that 
is itself antisocial, there is nothing inherently antisocial about a 14-
year-old being out at 11: 00 p.m. Rather, a curfew is designed to be 
instrumental: its ultimate purposes are to reduce the incidence of 
juvenile crime, protect youths from the corrupting influence of 
juvenile gangs, and reinforce parental authority. 13 These are indeed 
laudable aims. However, given the restrictions imposed upon the 
freedom to move about, the effectiveness of a curfew should be care-
mously. 1976 JOURNAL OF TIIB CilY COUNCIL 2054. There had been some -negative 
reaction at a hearing on the curfew, primarily from young people affected by it, see 
Detroit Free Press, Oct. 14, 1976, at 4D, col. 1, but the extensive comments from 
the public received by the council had been almost entirely positive, Interv~ew with 
City Council President Carl Levin, in Detroit (Oct. 19, 1976) (on file at the Michi-
gan Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Levin Interview]. 
The Civilian Board of Police Commissioners at first questioned the constitutional-
ity of the ordinance, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 20, 1976, at 3A, col. 6, which resulted 
in ad hominem attacks on the board by members of the council, see id., Aug. 21, 
1976, at lA, col. 3. The board did eventually endorse the ordinance. 
9. For example, the age limit of the Detroit ordinance is relatively high and the 
ordinance takes effect earlier in the evening than do most other ordinances. In addi-
tion, the ordinance allows almost none of the exceptions-e.g., for school events, au-
thorized errands, or exercise of first amendment rights-that mitigate the harshness 
of many other curfews. 
For an examination of the provisions of curfew ordinances in general, see text 
at notes 156-205 infra. 
10. See letter from Police Chief Philip Tannian to City Council President Carl 
Levin (Sept. 14, 1976) (on file at the Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter cited as 
Tannian Letter]. 
11. Commander Richard Dungy of the Special Operations Division explained 
that, "We're not going to be hovering around Cobo Hall asking peop1e for their IDs, 
as long as they're orderly going to and from their cars." Detroit Free Press, Aug. 
20, 1976, at 3A, col. 8. Lt. Charles Cargill of the Goals and Standards Section 
said, "I think we have to use a lot of discretion in arresting children and taking them 
to the precinct stations if they're not involved in gang activities," although he con-
ceded that the ordinance did not allow for such discretion. Id. at lOA, col. 2. 
12. See Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2. Lt. Sherrill did indicate that lone 
youths acting suspiciously after curfew hours have also been arrested. 
13. See text at notes 121-35 infra. 
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fully considered by both legislatures and courts. It was hoped that 
the Detroit situation would provide some guidance on the effective-
ness of a curfew, at least with respect to reducing the incidence of 
juvenile crime. Unfortunately, the available data are inconclusive, 14 
· although the Detroit police claimed to have brought the juvenile 
gang problem under control.111 
Recognizing that a legislature must decide whether to enact a 
juvenile curfew without the benefit of conclusive data on the effec-
tiveness of such laws, the remainder of this Note will focus primarily 
14. A comparison of arrest records for August-September 1976 with those from 
the same period in 1975 showed that juvenile arrests for serious crimes declined signi-
ficantly during the new extended curfew hours, but such arrests increased more than 
17% overall. Detroit Free Press, Oct. 115, 1976, at p. 3A, col. 6. In addition, lesser 
juvenile crime--possession of stolen property, vandalism, carrying concealed weapons, 
and so on-increased over 47% in the August-September period compared to the 
same months in 1975, and this type of crime occurred just as frequently during the 
extended curfew hours as it did in the same hours in 1975 without the curfew. Id, 
These statistics might suggest that the curfew only shifted the hours when crimes 
were committed, rather than reducing the total amount of crime. The data, how-
ever, are inconclusive, as shown by Tables 1 and 2 below: arrests were up for the 
ncfncurfew period, but "warned and released" figures were down from the previous 
year. 
Table 1 
OFFICIAL JUVENILE CONTACTS BY DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Total 10 p.m.-6 a.m. 
Aug.-Sept. 1975 883 293(33.2%) 
Aµg.-Sept. 1976 lli12 221(19.9%) 
The data for juveniles "warned and released," contained in Figure 2 below, show 
a different pattern. 
Table 2 
CONTACT OF DETROIT POLICE WITII JUVENILES 
Warned and Official 
Released Contact Total 
Aug.-Sept, 1975 3505(79.9%) 883(20.1 % ) 4388 
Aug.-Sept. 1976 3107(73.6%) 11112(26.4%) 4219 
The rise in official contacts may be the result of increased police stringency in 
dealing with juveniles. (Data for Tables 1 and 2, which was provided by the Detroit 
Police Department, are on file at the Michigan Law Review.) . 
In any case, causal relationships are notoriously difficult to show with nonexperi-
mental data. Several concurrent independent variables compound the problem of an-
alyzing the effectiveness of the curfew. For example, the size of the active police 
force increased, and the violence that precipitated the curfew, as well as the curfew 
itself, may have led to increased control by parents over their minor children. In 
addition, the members of the delinquent subculture were presumably aware of the in-
creased determination by the authorities to enforce the law more vigorously against 
juveniles. Moreover, the above statistics are also consistent with a shift in time 
of juvenile crime, rather than a general reduction. Another weakness of any 
analysis based on these statistics is that the variable we wish to study is the juvenile 
crime rate, and, since we do not know the age of the perpetrators of uncleared crimes, 
we can only measure rates of police contact with juveniles. Because of the rise in 
gang activity and the new curfew in 1976, we cannot assume that the percentage of 
crimes committed by juveniles remained constant. On the problem of measurement 
in studying crime, see generally N. MoRRis & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST PoLmCIAN's 
GUIDE TO CRIME CoNTROL 31-35 (1969), 
15. See Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2. 
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upon the constitutional issues raised by such ordinances.16 The free-
dom of movement that is limited by a curfew is, it will be argued, 
an unenumerated right protected by the ninth and fourteenth 
amendments. The constitutional rights of juveniles, however, -are 
not necessarily coextensive with those of adults. Certain characteris-
tics of juveniles-in particular, their lesser capacity for reason and 
self-control-imply that the strength of their right to freedom of 
movement is less than that of adults. The juvenile's right, then, 
should not be accorded sufficient weight to overcome the substantial 
countervailing public interests served by juvenile curfew ordinances. 
Furthermore, since these ordinances do not involve either a suspect 
classification or a fundamental interest, they should also withstand 
an equal protection challenge. 
Curfews vary widely in their specific provisions, however, and 
under a balancing test excessively strict ordinances may unconstitu-
tionally infringe the rights of juveniles. A wise legislature will not 
go to the brink of constitutionality, but rather will enact a curfew 
ordinance that provides the fewest possible restrictions on individual 
freedom consistent with its purpose. A Model Ordinance, designed 
with these considerations in mind, is set out in the Appendix. Finally, 
the application of a curfew involves special problems of vagueness, 17 
possible discriminatory enforcement, 18 and possible use as a tool 
to effectuate "pretext arrests" where less than probable cause for 
a noncurfew arrest exists.19 The similarities of curfews to and their 
differences from vagrancy ordinances suggest ways to minimize these 
problems without limiting the usefulness of the curfew ordinances. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUVENILE CURFEWS 
A. Constitutional Foundations for a Freedom of Movement 
General agreement exists that "[a]bsent a genuine emergency 
. a curfew aimed at all citizens could not survive constitutional 
16. For an alternative approach to the problem, see Note, Assessing the Constitu-
tional Validity of Juvenile Curfew Statutes, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 858 (1977), which 
reaches somewhat different conclusions than this Note. See also Note, Curfew 
Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U; PA. L. REv. 66 
(1958). Another recent commentary on the constitutionality of juvenile curfews ap-
peared in response to the district court's decision upholding one such ordinance in 
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by 
unpublished opinion noted at 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 
(1976), the first federal case to consider the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew. 
54 TEXAS L. REV. 812 (1976). The state courts that have dealt with the issue have 
reached conflicting conclusions. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 321, 339-48 (1974). 
17. See text at notes 179-83 infra. 
18. See note 211 infra. 
19. See text at notes 218-27 infra. 
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scrutiny."20 ~owever, the precise source of the constitutionally pro-
tected right that such a curfew would violate has not been clearly 
identified. Consequently, an examination of the source and scope 
of this right is necessary prior to a consideration of the extent to 
which it is shared by juveniles. 
Although indirectly restricting a variety of personal rights and 
interests, 21 a curfew most directly affects an individual's freedom to 
move about in public. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has 
proclaimed the importance of freedom of movement. 22 Some con-
fusion, however, has existed regarding the source of this right, 23 
stemming in part from the diversity of the cases that have discussed 
the concept of freedom of movement. The cases concerning state 
limits on interstate travel24 have involved issues of federalism20 and 
infringement of other important interests or rights-such as voting20 
or welfare27-in addition to freedom of movement, and thus their 
relevance to an analysis of the freedom of movement is limited. The 
cases dealing with international travel are somewhat more useful, 
since they focus on the right to travel rather than on the right to 
change one's residence. These cases, however, also involve other 
20. Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari to Bykofsky v. Borough 
of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 965 (1976). See, e.g., Hayes v. Municipal Court of 
Oklahoma City, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); City of Portland v. James, 
251 Ore. 8, 444 P.2d 554 (1968); City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 423 
P.2d 522 (1967). But see Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1916). 
21. See People v. Chambers, 32 Ill. App. 3d 444, 449, 335 N.E.2d 612, 617 
(1975), revd., 66 Ill. 2d 36, 360 N.E.2d 55 (1976), in which the majority held that 
a juvenile curfew indirectly violated the first amendment rights of freedom of speech, 
religion, assembly, and association, the exercise of which was dependent upon the 
freedom to move about in public. 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920), where the Court 
reaffirmed the existence of a "fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free gov-
ernments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective state, to move at 
will from place to ,place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress there-
from." 
23. Among the suggested sources have been the privileges and immunities clauses 
of article IV, § 2, United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920), and of the 
fourteenth amendment, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring); the interstate com-
merce clause, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. at 172-73; and the due process clauses 
of the fifth amendment, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958), and of the four-
teenth amendment, William v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900). 
24. The right involved in these cases might be characterized as a freedom to move 
or to change residence. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Memorial 
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 
330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
25. Article IV of the Articles of Confederation stated that "the people of each 
State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State." It can be 
argued that the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution was intended to 
preserve this right. See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294-96 (1920). 
26. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
27. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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distinct issues, such as freedom of speech and association28 and 
executive control over international relations. 29 
The Supreme Court case that is most apposite to the freedom 
of movement issues raised by curfews is Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville,30 in which the Court held that a vagrancy ordinance was 
unconstitutionally vague. 31 In referring to the ordinance's prohibi-
tions on such conduct as "night walking," "loafing," "wandering," 
or "strolling," the Court noted that 
these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we 
have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or 
in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part 
responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and 
self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have 
dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be non-
conformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have en-
couraged lives of high spirit rather than hushed, suffocating silence. 32 
The fundamental role of the freedom of movement identified by 
the Court in Papachristou suggests that "[t]he freedom to leave one's 
house and move about at will is 'of the very essence of a scheme 
of ordered liberty' . . . and hence is protected against state intru-
sions by the J):.;~ Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."33 
28. See !.ptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (striking down a 
statutory denial of passports to Communists). 
29. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding an executive ban on travel 
to Cuba). 
30. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
31. 405 U.S. at 170-71. 
A legislative enactment which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
language so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due proc-
ess of law-to wit, providing fair warning and notice of what is prohibited or 
required so that one may act accordingly. . • . In addition, laws must provide 
reasonably clear standards for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in 
order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. 
by unpublished opinion noted at 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 
(1976). 
The void for vagueness doctrine "has been used by the Supreme Court almost in-
variably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peri-
pheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms." Note, The Void-For-Vagueness 
Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960). 
32. 405 U.S. at 164. 
The freedom of movement upheld in Papachristou has deep histotjcal roots, see 
Z. CHAFES, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIIE CONS1TIUTION OF 1787, at 162-204 
(1956), and was formally recognized in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. 
Article 13(1) states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement and resi-
dence within the borders of each State." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217A(IIJ), U.N. Doc. A/777, at 912 (1948). 
33. Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari to Bykofsky v. Borough 
of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 964 (1976) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319,325 (1937)). See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 
(1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted at 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 964 (1976). 
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The fourteenth amendment might appear to be an appropriate 
source for a constitutional challenge to curfew ordinances, for, in ad-
dition to incorporating and making applicable to the states34 many 
of the substantive guarantees of the first eight amendments, 36 the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been held to 
subsume some rights not expressly mentioned in the Bill of Rights.30 
Relying on the fourteenth amendment alone as the basis for a free-
dom of movement may prove unsatisfactory, however, because of the 
modem Court's tendency to determine the substantive rights con-
tained in the due process clause only by incorporating the guarantees 
enumerated in the first eight amendments.37 The Court's hesitancy 
to look beyond these enumerated guarantees is rooted in its rejection 
of the judicial philosophy of the Lochner era, during which the Court 
had employed the due process clause to invalidate state legislation 
34. The Bill of Rights has been held to limit only federal power. Barron v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 
How.) 410, 434 (1847). Although the rights enunciated in the Bill of Rights may 
have been considered natural rights that were guaranteed rather than granted by the 
Constitution, see E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1928), the framers did not intend to give the federal judiciary 
the power to interpret and enforce these rights against the states. But see B. PATTER· 
SON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 13-15, 36-43 (1955). 
35. For example, the fourteenth has been held to incorporate and make applicable 
to the states the eighth amendment, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), 
and the first, see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Despite the advocacy of Justice Black, see, e.g., 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), the 
consensus seems to be that not all Bill of Rights provisions are made applicable to 
the states by the fourteenth amendment. Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter believed 
that the due process clause of the fourteenth included only those rights "implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For ex-
ample, due process now subsumes the right to counsel of the sixth amendment, see 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), but it does not include the seventh 
amendment civil jury trial guarantee, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62-63 
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 
(1968) (inquiry switched to whether the safeguard was "fundamental to the Amer-
ican scheme of justice"). See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" itz the Four-
teenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Ema-
nations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 235 (1965). 
36. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), holding that the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment entitled juveniles to the procedural right to proof 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Black's strict constructionism led him 
in, this case to reject any extension beyond the specific constitutional language. 397 
U.S. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting); Cf. note 35 supra. See also Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 70 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
37. See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 14 CoLUM. L. REV, 1410 
(1914). But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking 
down, on due process grounds, a housing ordinance that limited categories of relatives 
who could live together). 
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that attempted to regulate economic activity. 38 The modem Court 
has since overturned most of the decisions of the Lochner era, 39 re-
fused to apply due process to economic regulation, 40 and spoken 
forcefully against any activist jurisprudence in this area. 41 Of 
course, the reluctance to apply substantive due process to economic 
regulation does not necessarily preclude finding constitutional pro-
tection for the freedom of movement in the due process clause, for, 
when legislation has threatened unenumerated noneconomic rights 
-as in Griswold v. Connecticut42 and Roe v. W ade43-the Court 
has been willing to strike it down by using, though not always articu-
lating, a due process rationale.44 However, given the uncertain ap-
plication of the due process clause to unenumerated rights, attention 
should be directed elsewhere to find a more solid basis for a con-
stitutionally protected right to freedom of movement. 
The judicial fear of an expansive "substantive due process,"45 
38. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's 
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). For a gen-
eral discussion of the evolution of the Court's views toward substantive due process 
and economic regulation, see Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police 
Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689, 
699-704 (1976); Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Em-
brasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 419 (1973). 
39. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Note, however, the continuing validity of the sub-
stantive due process cases from this era involving noneconomic rights, such as Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (education), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925) (same). See text at notes 42-44 infra. · 
40. The extent of judicial deference to legislative decisionmaking in this area can 
be seen in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding prohibition on debt-
adjustment by non-lawyers); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (ban 
on the fitting of prescription eyeglasses by non-optometrists valid); Railway Express 
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding ban on advertising on motor 
vehicles). 
41. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-31 (1963); Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). "[W]ith the New Deal the very words [substantive due 
process] became unmentionable for the Court." Henkin, supra note 37, at 1417. 
See also Perry, supra note 38, at 705; Strong, supra note 38, at 449-54; cases cited 
in notes 39-40 supra. 
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), discussed in text at notes 57-60 infra. 
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court in Roe held, in a lengthy and somewhat 
incoherent opinion, that a woman has a privacy-based right to have an abortion that 
no governmental interest was sufficient to override until the last trimester of preg-
nancy. 
44. The Court in Roe, in finding that the Texas abortion law unjustifiably in-
vaded privacy and therefore violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, did cite decisions that made it clear that "only personal rights that can be 
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' • • • are included 
in [the] guarantee of personal privacy." 410 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added). 
For the variety of rationales that led to the result in Griswold, see text at notes 
58-60 infra. 
45. Justice Black advocated abandonment of the substantive due process approach 
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laden with the historical baggage that accompanies that phrase, can 
be circumvented by using the ninth amendment to protect certain un-
enumerated constitutional rights, 46 including freedom of movement. 
Although this analysis would require use of the fourteenth amend-
ment to apply to the states the guarantees thus subsumed under the 
ninth amendment, 47 this application would be no more offensive than 
the current incorporation of provisions of the first eight amendments 
into the fourteenth. 
It is not inconsistent with constitutional history to give such a sub-
stantial role to the ninth amendment. 48 When James Madison 
introduced a bill of rights49 in the first Congress, he included what 
became the ninth amendment to combat the danger that a partial 
enumeration of reserved rights and powers would disparage any 
rights that were not enumerated. 5° Commentators disagree about 
the precise function Madison envisioned for the ninth amendment, Gt 
and, in any case, it is unclear whether the framers shared Madison's 
because he feared that its continued application would set the Court free, without 
textual moorings, "periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to 
conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes 'civilized 
decency' and 'fundamental liberty and justice.'" Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 
46, 69 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). But cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("[The] history [of substantive due process] counsels caution 
and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment .... "). 
46. See Kauper, supra note 35, at 254-55. 
47. See id. at 255; Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the Ninth Amend-
ment and Its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1, 17, 24 (1972). 
At least one commentator has asserted that the ninth amendment was intended 
to apply directly to the states. See B. PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 37. 
48; For a more extensive discussion of ninth amendment history, see B. PATTER-
SON, supra note 34; Dunbar, lames Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA, L. 
REv. 627 (1956); Ringold, supra note 47; Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF, 
L. REV. 787 (1959). 
49. The original Constitution contained no bill of rights because, said the Fed-
eralists, "an imperfect enumeration [of reserved powers] would throw all implied 
power into the scale of government; and the rights to the people would be rendered 
incomplete." 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON TIIE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 409 (2d ed. 
1836) (James Wilson of Pennsylvania). See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 631 (J, 
Hamilton ed. 1868) (A. Hamilton). Since many of the framers believed in natural 
law, they equated "rights" with "areas of no legitimate government power," For a 
critique of the contemporary natural-law approach to the ninth amendment, see text 
at notes 61-65 infra. 
50. It has been objected also against a Bill of Rights, that, by enumerating par-
ticular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which 
were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that 
those rights which were not singled out were intended to be assigned into the 
hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one 
of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of 
a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. 
I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the 
fourth resolution. 
1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (remarks of J. Madison). See 
also 3 J. SrORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 751-
52 (1st ed. 1833). 
51. One commentator has used Madison's insistence that the tenth amendment 
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intent.112 Although the framers might have had a clear conception 
of certain natural rights that the ninth amendment was to protect, 
those rights were never specified. 53 During the first 170 years fol-
lowing the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Court, on the rare oc-
casions when the ninth amendment surfaced in constitutional adjudi-
cation, dismissed it as a truism. 54 The Court occasionally seemed 
to confuse the ninth amendment with the tenth, reading the former 
as well as the latter merely as restricting the federal government to 
the powers specifically delegated to it, 55 rather than as a source of 
rights that could check the exercise of otherwise legitimate federal 
and state powers. 116 
not inc,ude the word "expressly" as a limit on the "powers not delegated" to show 
the extent of his federalism and, therefore, to show that the ninth amendment was 
not intended to be a serious limitation on the government's power. Rogge, supra note 
48, at 79. Dunbar, on the other hand, saw Madison as a libertarian who emphasized 
the importance of reading both powers and rights broadly. Dunbar, supra note 48, 
at 635. Franklin, who wished to use the ninth amendment in a penumbra-like 
fashion, see text at notes 66-74 infra, rather than as a source of separate, natural 
rights, cited a letter from Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, indicating his "fear 
that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained 
in the requisite latitude." Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method 
and Its Implications for Republican Form of Governments: Griswold v. Connecticut, 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TuL. L. REv. 487, 503 (1966). Thus, each com-
mentator seemed to be able to find in Madison what he came looking for. 
52. Relatively little debate on the ninth amendment occurred in the House. See 
B. PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 16-17. The views of the Senate are even more ob-
scure, since Senate debates from that period were not published. 
53. Here, as with the fourteenth amendment, it may be that the framers did not 
have a clear conception of those rights, but rather had only "vague aspirations." See 
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The 
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 139 (1949). 
54. See Tennessee Elec. Power· Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939); Ash-
wander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936). See also Commonwealth & S. Corp. 
v. SEC, 134 F.2d 747, 753 (3d Cir. 1943). 
This reading of the ninth amendment occurred despite Chief Justice John Mar-
shall's insistence that "[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution 
is intended to be without effect." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
174 (11803). 
55. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 15, 96 (1947), in which 
the Court stated: 
Therefore, when objection is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes 
upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must 
be directed toward the granted power. . . . If granted power is found, neces-
sarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, must fail. 
330 U.S. at 96. 
56. Rights and powers are not always mutually exclusive. As Madison noted 
when proposing the Bill of Rights, "The General Government has a. right to pass 
all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the 
collection are within the discretion of the Legislature: may not general warrants 
[prohibited by the fourth amendment] be considered necessary for this purpose?" 
I ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (remarks of J. Madison). Thus, 
if the ninth amendment ·is a source of rights, assertion of a legitimate power that 
arguably infringes a ninth amendment right begins rather than ends the constitutional 
analysis. 
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The Court seriously discussed the meaning of the ninth amend-
ment for the first time in Griswold v. Connecticut.51 In that case, 
the Court, through Justice Douglas, struck down a statute prohibiting 
the use of contraceptives. Unfortunately, the Court reached no con-
sensus on the source of the statute's unconstitutionality. Justice White 
focused on the law's irrationality in achieving any legitimate state 
purpose, 58 Justice Harlan relied on the due process clause, 110 and 
Justice Goldberg-joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Bren-
nan-found the necessary source in' the ninth amendment alone, 
which he viewed as protecting a variety of unenumerated "natural" 
or fundamental rights. 60 
Justice Goldberg's natural law approach has been adopted by 
many of the commentators, 61 and it may be the most accurate reflec-
tion of the framer's conception of the ninth amendment, given the 
importance of Locke and Coke in eighteenth century political 
thought. A natural rights position, however, leaves no principled 
basis for criticizing the decisions of the Lochner era, 62 which may, 
in fact, more closely reflect the framers' conception of natural rights68 
than Griswold or Roe. 64 If the Court is to enforce a concept of 
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
58 .. 381 U.S. at 502, 505-07 ·(White, J., concurring). 
59. 381 U.S. at 499, 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
60. ''The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers 
of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected 
from government infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights speci-
fically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments." 381 U.S. at 486, 488 
(Goldberg, J., concurring). 
Justice Black, who dissented because the right asserted was not protected by a 
specific constitutional provision, 381 U.S. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting), asserted that 
the ninth amendment and due process arguments are "the same thing-merely using 
different words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary power to invalidate 
any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or offensive." 381 
U.S. at 511. Justice Stewart also dissented because he rejected substantive due proc-
ess, saw no infringement of any of the first eight amendments, and read the ninth 
amendment purely as a limit on federal powers. 381 U.S. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). 
61. See, e.g., B. PA'ITERSON, supra note 34; Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936); Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth 
Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L REV, 231 (1975); 
Ringold, supra note 47; Note, Unenumerated Rights-Substantive Due Process, The 
Ninth Amendment, and John Stuart Mill, 1971 Wis. L REV. 922. 
Occasional judicial opinions have also expressed such natural rights ideas: 
There are certain vital principles in our free republican governments, which will 
determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as 
to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for 
personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government 
was established. 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 
U.S. 578,589 (1897); Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655,663 (1874). 
62. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
63. See note 70 infra. 
64. See the discussion of Roe in note 44 supra. 
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natural rights not defined by the philosophy of the framers, it needs 
some basis for defining which rights are "natural."65 
A suggested alternative approach for protecting unenumerated 
rights draws on Justice Douglas' more subtle use of the ninth amend-
ment in the plurality opinion in Griswold. After rejecting an un-
fettered substantive due process approach, 66 Douglas stressed that 
the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them 
life and substance,"67 citing several amendments, including the 
ninth. The penumbra! approach suggested by Douglas demands not 
merely reading each of the first eight amendments broadly, 68 but 
also "project[ing] their total force beyond the texts themselves, so 
as to derive a general principle stated in none of these amend-
ments. "69 The first process is purely deductive, the second is induc-
tive, but both begin with the text of the Constitution. 
The ninth amendment must draw upon the contemporary mean-
ing of the other constitutional provisions. Thus, even if the framers 
intended to protect economic rights, 70 a strong ninth amendment will 
65. Among those sources that have been suggested for a catalog of natural 
rights are the U.N. Charter of Human Rights, see Paust, supra note 61, at 265; the 
traditional rights of Englishmen, -see Kelsey, supra note 61, at 313-14; and John 
Mill's On Liberty, see Note, supra note 61, at 932-36. 
Despite their disagreement on the definition of natural rights, natural rights ad-
vocates are usually absolutists, asserting that such rights, once found, are immune 
from any governmental infringement. B. PATTERSON, supra note, 34, at 4. See 
Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 
814, 822-23 (1966); Perry, supra note 38, at 694. 
66. ''We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and pro-
priety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions." 
381 U.S. at 482. 
67. 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Douglas was refining a concept he had enunciated 
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961): "'Liberty' is a conception that sometimes 
gains content from the emanations of other specific guarantees . . . or from experi-
ence with the requirements of a free society." 367 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). 
68. Deriving protection of symbolic speech from the first amendment is one ex-
ample of broad constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 
566 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 
503 (1969). 
69. Franklin, supra note 51, at 490. One need not accept Franklin's contention 
that the framers intended the ninth amendment to embody the use of a technique 
analogous to that used in civil-law jurisprudence to find the approach both useful and 
permitted by the text of the Constitution. 
70. Dunbar, supra note 48, stated that the provisions included by Madison in his 
Bill of Rights "with but one exception, were protections of civil and political rights 
of individuals. . . . [Madison] rigorously excluded from his resolutions all the 
numerous proposals of the States which would have obstructed in specific ways con-
gressional powers over economic policy." Id. at 637. See also Henkin, supra note 
37, at 1417. Most historians, however, believe that the framers' political philosophy 
was one of limiting the power of government in the sphere of economics. See, e.g., 
C. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF 11lE CoNSTITUTION OF TIIE l,JNITED 
122 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:109 
not necessitate a return to the Lochner philosophy if the current in-
terpretation of the rest of the Constitution focuses upon personal 
rather than economic rights. 71 Our understanding of the ninth 
amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."72 Just as 
a historical approach to the ninth amendment suggests that "the 
rights reserved were to be of a nature comparable to the rights 
enumerated,"73 a penumbra! approach ensures a continuing corre-
spondence between reserved rights and enumerated rights. 74 
A ninth amendment freedom of movement can be derived from 
a contemporary reading of various other amendments under such a 
penumbra! approach. Freedom of movement may be viewed as a 
prerequisite to the exercise of certain first amendment rights-most 
notably "the right of the people peaceably to assemble,"75 but also 
the rights of association and even of speech itself. 76 Moreover, free-
dom of movement may be viewed as the essence of the liberty pro-
STATES (1913). This analysis seems to be supported by the existence of textual bases 
for asserting rights against economic regulation, including the contracts clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. I § 10, and the mention of "property" in the due process clauses of the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments. 
71. Compare Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 532 (1972), and Home Bldg. & Loan 
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). 
72, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an 
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily 
confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes . . . . 
This is peculiarly true of constitutions . . . . In the application of a constitu-
tion, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what 
may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of applica-
tion as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. . . . Rights declared in 
words might be lost in reality. , 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). But cf, Rehnquist, The Notion 
of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693, 696-97 (1976) ("[a] mere change 
in public opinion . . . should not change the meaning of the Constitution"), 
73. Redlich, Are There "CertaiA Rights .•. Retained by the People?," 37 N.Y. 
U.L. REV. 787, 810 (1962). 
74. One clear limit imposed by such a correspondence is that the rights be rights 
against the government, not from it. See B. PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 58; Red-
lich, supra note 73, at 812. For example, it would be distorting the history and the 
text of the Constitution to find a right to education protected by the ninth amend• 
ment. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 234 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
("Those rights [not mentioned in the Constitution], like the right to pure air and 
pure water, may well be rights 'retained by the people' under the Ninth Amend-
ment"). 
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
16. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., 
concurring); Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 200, 163 N.W.2d 207, 210 (1968); 
Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 IowA L. REV. 6 (1955). A curfew could be 
viewed as a limitation on the time, manner, and place where first amendment rights 
can be exercised. See generally Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. 
L. 'RE.v. 1482 (1970). 
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tected by the fifth amendment, for to say "that you may move about, 
at least within your own community, is simply another way of saying 
that you are not imprisoned."77 The eighth, amendment guarantee 
against excessive baiF8 expresses a similar concern about imprison-
ment that is not justified by public necessity. Freedom of move-
ment, even if not directly deducible from any of these amendments, 
is a part of the pattern formed when they are woven together. 
It is important that limits be placed on the scope of the ninth 
amendment, for an overly expansive ninth amendment could seri-
ously threaten the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking much as did 
the broad interpretation once given substantive due process. The 
use of a penumbral-inductive approach to the ninth amendment does 
not of itself place limits on an activist Supreme Court. With both 
a sufficiently broad reading of penumbras and attenuated lines of 
induction, "a theory of rights implied from the specifics of the Bill 
of Rights can be pushed to the point where the distinction between 
such 'implied' rights and the formulation of 'fundamental' rights in 
the interpretation of the due process clause is wholly verbal and with-
out substance. ,no 
Two strategies, however, can be utilized to reduce substantially 
the risk of such misuse. First, although the protection accorded the 
core of such explicit rights as freedom of speech may be absolute, 
the penumbra! rights of the ninth amendment must be developed 
through a process of balancing. 80 This balancing should not, on the 
77. J. TENBROEK, THE CONSTITUTION AND TiiE RIGHT OF FREE MOVEMENT 
( 1955). 
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
79. Kauper, supra note 35, at 252. 
80. Most of the treatment accorded the issue of balancing versus absolutism has 
been in the context of the first amendment. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 
(1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 ( 1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 
360 U.S. 109 {1959); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF TiiE FmST 
AMENDMENT 53-58 (1966); P. KAUPER, CML LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 111-
25 (1962); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1963); 
Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 
CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962). 
Under an absolutist interpretation, any infringement of an activity subsumed under 
the right is unconstitutional, regardless of the strength of the governmental interest 
promoted. Alternatively, an activity that is determined to be outside of the right in 
question is totally unprotected. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community. 
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that "symbolic 
speech" is not protected by the first amendment). Balancing, on the other hand, 
although allowing the courts to take account of the relative strengths of the constitu-
tional and governmental interests in a particular case, provides no guidelines for meas-
uring the scope of the interests implicated or for designing the scales to be µsed in 
balancing. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
Both absolutism and balancing, when stated as dogma, involve intractable prob-
lems. Perhaps the approach of definitional balancing proposed in Nimmer, The 
Right To Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and 
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one hand, be entirely ad hoc. Both the asserted constitutional right 
and the countervailing governmental interest should be considered 
at a sufficient level of generality to provide a guide for subsequent 
judicial and legislative decisions. The Court should take into account 
not merely the adjudicative facts of a case, but also the legislative facts 
that indicate the impact of a particular decision on society. 81 On the 
other hand, ninth amendment cases cannot be resolved through appli-
cation of Wechslerian. "neutral pI1inciples," which would demand that 
no right be recognized unless a precise interpretation of its scope and 
meaning could be made in the first case in which it arises and con-
sistently followed thereafter. 82 The scope of ninth amendent rights is 
not obvious in the abstract, so that "[b]y precluding the Court from 
making a restrained and tentative move, a Wechslerian ninth amend-
ment could destroy the Court's capacity to respond to the growing 
needs of a changing society in all but the clearest cases."83 
Second, the Court should engage in a dialogue with the political 
branches on the content of ninth amendment rights. 114 The lack of 
a textual anchor makes such a dialogue particularly important. sis 
One technique for achieving the desired exchange is for the Court 
to adopt a least drastic means approach when striking down legislation 
that it believes contravenes the ninth amendment, thus permitting 
the legislature to reconsider its actions and possibly to find a means 
to fulfill its purpose that is less offensive to individual rights. 86 If, 
however, the legislature has already seriously considered the as-
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968), provides the most workable 
solution. 
81. See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. Cr. REV, 
75. One area in which a series of decisions has lead to the rudimentary development 
of an understandable framework for application is the right to an administrative hear-
ing. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 
593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Viewed together, these decis-
ions indicate the beginnings of a principled rationale for when an administrative 
hearing is required that lower courts and legislative bodies can apply. See generally 
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
82. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REv. 1 (1959). 
83. Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. REV. 1, 43 
(1968). 
84. See Perry, supra note 38, at 716-18. 
85. One of the traditional justifications for judicial review has been the judiciary's 
special role in interpreting written documents. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch.) 137, 176-78 (1803) (stressing that this country has a written constitution 
to which courts must look in determining the law applicable to a given case). In 
ninth amendment cases, however, the existence and scope of the alleged rights depend 
much more heavily on societal consensus, and therefore the courts have, perhaps, less 
competence to define these rights than the legislature. 
86. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). See also Tribe, 
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1975). 
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serted ninth amendment rights and determined that they are not 
derivable from a contemporary understanding of the rest of the Con-
stitution, the Court should defer to that judgment. 87 
B. Curfews and the Constitutional Rights of Juveniles 
Recognizing freedom of movement as a ninth amendment right 
allows courts to weigh the legitimate interests of the state against the 
competing interests of the individual when passing on the constitu-
tionality of any limitations imposed on the freedom to move about. 
Under the balancing approach, states may constitutionally impose a 
variety of minor restraints on the movement of all citizens, such as 
limiting drivers' licenses to those who demonstrate a specified level 
of proficiency in operating an automobile, enforcing maximum speed 
limits on streets and highways, and placing tolls on roads or 
bridges. 88 Even quite drastic limits on freedom of movement are 
permissible when the state interest is sufficiently strong. The cases 
arising out of riot curfews consistently recognize the extent of the 
infringement of individual rights, but they uphold the curfews be-
cause of the extraordinary nature of the situation89 and the lack of 
any less· drastic alternatives. 90 Absent such powerful governmental 
87. See generally Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 15 M1cir. L. RBv. 
1162, 1172-83 (1977). To be sure, in most cases the challenge is to a regulation, 
where. the concept of deference to the political branch is inapposite, or to a law whose 
history does not reflect any serious consideration and reasoned rejection of the as-
serted right. Two examples of the sort of reasoned legislative consideration that 
would invoke this type of deference are the debates over the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and over the grounds for impeachment during the Watergate crisis. 
This close judicial examination of the legislative history in determining the con-
stitutionality of a statute superficially resembles "motive review," which is generally 
rejected by courts as an undue interference with legislative sovereignty. See Palmer 
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). Motive review, however, involves invalidating 
a statute that is constitutional on its face; here, in contrast, the Court would be up-
holding a statute that it would otherwise consider unconstitutional on its face because 
it has decided to defer to a reasoned legislative judgment on the contemporary mean-
ing of the ninth amendment. 
88. If drivers' licenses were denied to 80% of the population or the speed limit 
were reduced to 10 miles per hour on all roads to increase highway safety, or if the 
toll on all bridges into New York were $50 to reduce congestion in the city, the in-
fringement on freedom of movement might outweigh the advancement of the govern-
mental interest. 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 943 (1971); State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E.2d 449 (1971); Ervin v. 
State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 163 N.W.2d 207 (1968). But cf. United States v. Matthews, 
419 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in which Judge Skelly Wright, dissenting from the 
affirmance of a conviction under the District of Columbia riot statute, said that such 
a law "threatens people with arrest merely for going outside their homes, even for 
legitimate purposes. Individuals may properly fear that exercise of their rights peace-
fully to use the public streets to obtain food, to go to work, or to locate their families 
will expose them to arrest on a serious criminal charge." 419 F.2d at 1194. 
90. See Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556 (D.C. 1969). See gen-
erally Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 11 YALE L.J. 1560 (1968). 
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interests, the severe restrictions on the freedom of movement of 
adults imposed by a general curfew would render it unconstitu-
tional. 91 It is suggested, however, that such compelling interests are 
not necessary to justify a juvenile curfew, because children differ 
from adults in ways relevant to the extent of protection that should 
be accorded their freedom of movement. 
Although apparently recognizing the obvious fact ·that children 
differ from adults, 92 the courts have yet to articulate clearly the rele-
vance of these differences in terms of the constitutional rights of 
juveniles. Early cases suggested that the special nature of children 
somehow limited their capacity for full exercise of certain constitu-
tional rights, thus allowing the state .to restrict the activities of 
juveniles in ways that would be constitutionally impermissible if ap-
plied to adults. 93 More recently, however, the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that "[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the 
91. See text at note 20 supra. 
92. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968). 
93. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In that case, the Court 
upheld a law forbidding minors to sell newspapers against a first amendment chal-
lenge by a Jehovah's Witness, explaining that "[i]t is the interest of youth itself, and 
of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given 
opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed ,. • . citizens." 
321 U.S. at 165. 
Recently the Court stated that it "long has recognized that the State has some-
what broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults." Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
The framers almost certainly shared the belief that children lacked the capacity 
for the full exercise of many basic human rights. The writings of the philosophers 
from whom they drew much of their political thought reflect this conclusion. Locke, 
for example, said that when a person is mature, 
he is presumed to know how far that Law is to be his guide, and how far he 
may make use of his Freedom, and so comes to have it; till then some Body 
else must guide him . . . . 
To turn him loose to an unrestrain'd Liberty, before he has Reason to guide 
him, is not allowing the privilege of his Nature, to be free; but to thrust him 
out amongst Brutes . . . . 
J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 325, 327 (P. Laslett ed. 1960) (em-
phasis original). Similarly, Rousseau believed that "[w]e are born weak, we have 
need of help; . . . we are born stupid, we have need of understanding. All that we 
are not possessed of at our birth, and which we require when grown up, is bestowed 
on us by education." 1 J. ROUSSEAU, EMILIE AND SOPHIE 4 (1783). Even John 
Stuart Mill, the great libertarian, would not make his philosophy applicable to chil-
dren. 
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply 
only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speakmg 
of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that 
of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being 
taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as 
against external injury. 
J. MILL, ON LmER1Y 15 (World's Classics ed. 1912). This is because children are 
not yet "capable of being improved by free and equal discussion." Id. 
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Constitution and possess constitutional rights,"04 and thus has 
struck down as unconstitutional laws and practices limiting children's 
symbolic speech rights, 95 denying certain procedural protections to 
juvenile court defendants, 96 requiring parental consent for abortions, 97 
and prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors. 98 Other recent 
decisions indicate, however, that the constitutional rights of juveniles 
are not necessarily coextensive with those of adults. Thus, the Court 
has refused to apply automatically to juvenile court adjudications all 
the protections of a criminal trial, 99 including the right to a jury, 100 
and has denied the right to a hearing prior to corporal punishment 
of students.101 And in Ginsberg v. New York,192 the Court upheld 
a conviction under a statute defining obscenity more broadly for chil-
dren than for adults, 193 prompting Justice Stewart to suggest in his 
concurring opinion that "a State may permissibly determine that, at 
least in some precisely delineated areas, a child . . . is not possessed 
94. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). See Carey v. Pop-
ulation Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977): 
Thus minors are entitled to constitutional protection for freedom of speech, 
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), West Virginia Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); equal protection against racial 
discrimination, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); due process 
in civil contexts, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); and a variety of rights 
of defendants in criminal proceedings, including the requirement of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, In-re Wins/zip, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the prohibition of 
double jeopardy, Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the rights to notice, coun-
sel, confrontation and cross-examination, and not to incriminate oneself, In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and the protection against coerced confessions, Gal-
legos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) .. 
431 U.S. at 692 n.14. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("[W]hatever may 
be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights 
is for adults alone"). 
95. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist, 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
96. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
97. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
98. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
99. "We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these Constitutional provis-
ions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the State." In re Gault, 
387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
100. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
101. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
102. 390 U.S. 528 (1968). 
103. The holdings in Ginsberg and Tinker illustrate that the Court recognizes 
the existence of and limitations on children's constitutional rights. Although Tinker 
acknowledges the first amendment symbolic speech rights of minors, Ginsberg sug-
gests that children's first amendment rights are not coextensive with adults' rights. 
Of course, somewhat different first amendment interests are involved in the two 
cases. The definition of obscenity relates to the right to be informed and to have 
access to broadcasts and publications without censorship. Symbolic speech, on the 
other hand, relates to the freedom of self-expression and the right to express unpop-
ular views-i.e., to the dissemination of ideas by juveniles rather than to them. 
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of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition 
of First Amendment guarantees."104 
Given this somewhat inconsistent collection of decisions, it is not 
surprising that a lack of uniformity exists in the presumptions of 
various courts105 and commentators106 concerning the constitutional 
rights of minors.107 Some order can be brought to the cases, how-
ever, by reading them as limiting -the constitutional rights of children 
only where the special characteristics of children are relevant to the 
right in question. If children, because of their immaturity, are less 
likely to exercise a particular right wisely, and if misuse of the right 
may result in immediate harm or entail consequences that signifi-
cantly limit later freedom, then these considerations should be re-
flected ).n $e scope of the right itself.108 It is not inconsistent with 
104. 390 U.S. at 649-50. 
105. In S****S**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560 (Me. 1973), the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine, in upholding some rather vague standards for juvenile court jurisdic-
tion, said: ,. ' 
Just as the natural parent may constitutionally place limitation on the child's 
freedom of locomotion and may substitute the will and judgment of the parent 
for that of the child and thus constrain the child's will for his own protection, 
so also may the State in the exercise of its parens patriae guardianship. 
299 A.2d at 568. 
• In contrast, in State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975), the Su-
preme Court of Washington upheld a minor's right to an abortion, proclaiming that 
"prima facie, the constitutional rights of minors . . . are coextensive with those of 
adults." 84 Wash. 2d at 904, 530 P.2d at 263. 
106. Compare Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Pre-
sumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39(3) LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 8, 12 n.13 (Sum-
mer 1975) ("a ruling against the child in a case involving an otherwise 'fundamental 
right' should not tum on the circumstance of childhood itself") and Note, Parental 
Consent Requirements and Prfracy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controver-
sy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1008-09 (1975) ("the Court appears to have determined 
that, although important in other respects, capacity is not relevant in determining ap-
plicability of fundamental rights to minors") with Hafen, Children's Liberation and 
the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their 
"Rights,'' 1976 B.Y.L. REV. 605. Hafen asserts that "[w]hen children are involved, 
a significant distinction can be drawn between legal rights that protect one from un• 
due interference by the state or from the harmful acts of others and legal rights that 
permit persons to make affirmative choices of binding consequence." Id, at 644. As 
to the latter type of rights, restraints on minors are justified "to protect children from 
the excesses of their immature faculties and to promote the development of their abil-
ity ultimately to assume responsibility." Id. at 613. 
107. The oifficulties involved in defining the rights of juveniles have not escaped 
the attention of the Court. "The question of the extent of state power to regulate 
conduct of minors not constitutionally regulable when committed by adults is a vex• 
ing one, perhaps not susceptible of precise answer." Carey v. Population Servs. 
Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977). 
10~. An alternative approach, suggested in 54 TEXAS L. REv. 812 (1976), com-
pares the consequences of a denial of a particular right to adults vis-a-vis a denial 
to minors in order to determine if the scope of that right should be narrower for 
minors. Applying this analysis to juvenile curfews and the freedom of movement, 
the author concludes that the importance of dating and other nighttime social activ-
ities to the healthy socialization of adolescents may require recognition that the right 
to freedom of movement for juveniles is at least as extensive as for adults. Id. at 
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the recent line of Supreme Court cases to consider freedom of move-
ment a right of this character. 
Freedom of movement differs from the rights to procedural due 
process, which in general are not related to the maturity of the 
individual and consequently cannot be abridged merely because the 
person involved is not an adult.100 Rather, freedom of movement 
is more analogous to those rights that involve independent decision-
making, such as the right of privacy inherent in the decision to 
terminate a pregnancy110 or to purchase pomography111 or contra-
ceptives.112 With respect to these rights, the Court has recognized 
the relevance of minors' lesser capacity for making important deci-
sions and has suggested that the state need not show as compelling 
a governmental interest in order to restrict their exercise by juveniles 
as when such restrictions are applied to adults.113 
819-20. The difficulty with this approach is that, in failing to consider the ability 
to exercise the particular right safely and wisely, it ignores the minor's reduced judg-
mental capacity. Cf. Note, supra note 106, at 1008-09, 1011 n.73 (capacity not 
relevant in applying fundamental right, although scope of right might justifiably be 
narrowed by recognizing opposing state, parental, or family interests). See also notes 
114-16 infra and accompanying text. 
109. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
110. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) ("our holding 
. . • does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effec-
tive consent for termination of her pregnancy") (emphasis added). 
111. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J,, con-
curring), 
112. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977) (Bren-
nan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in part IV of the opinion); 431 
U.S. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result with respect 
to part IV); 431 U.S. at 713-14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
The extensive protection accorded the right of sexual privacy in Carey and Dan-
forth does not necessarily imply that the burden on the state to demonstrate interests 
sufficient to justify infringing upon the right of juveniles to move about freely will 
be as difficult to overcome as in these sexual privacy cases. See Note, supra note 
106, at 1009-11 (arguing need for compelling state interest to regulate juvenile access 
to contraceptives). Even for adults, the right to freedom of movement is not as 
broadly defined as the right to sexual privacy. Compare note 89 supra and accom-
panying text with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
This conclusion follows in part from the fact that decisions relating to sexual con-
duct are of a very intimate and personal nature--and thus not generally a legitimate 
concern of the government-in contrast to the exercise of freedom of movement, 
which may directly affect the interests of others. 
Carey and Danforth may also be distinguished from the curfew situation by not-
ing that there were potential long-term deleterious consequences-premature and un-
wanted motherhood-for the child stemming from the .denial of the rights involved 
in those cases, whereas a restriction of rights under a curfew arguably has only short-
term negative consequences, but see 54 TEXAS L. REV. 812, 819-20 (1976) (curfew 
inhibits "personal and social maturation"). 
113. See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text. It is, of course, hardly a 
unique result that the special qualities of juveniles justify granting lesser rights. 
Minors below a certain age, for example, may not vote, see, e.g., MICH. CoNsr. art. 
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Two components of maturation are particularly significant to the 
exercise of the freedom of movement. The first, the ability to make 
reasoned judgments, depends on intellectual capacity, which in-
creases with age through early adulthood, 114 and on knowledge 
and experience, which also grow over time.115 Until individuals 
develop a certain level of judgmental capacity, they are more likely 
to follow momentary impulses and thus to engage in irresponsible 
behavior without proper consideration of the possible consequences 
to themselves and to others.116 
2, § l; cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (11970) (upholding 18-year-old voting in 
all federal elections), or marry, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.103 (1970), and 
are required to attend school, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 380.1561 (West 
Supp. 19.77); but cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding right of 
Amish parents to exempt their children from state compulsory education system fol-
lowing the eighth grade). In each area, it is assumed that the child lacks the requisite 
maturity to make a wise decision and that the adverse effects of an "immature" deci-
sion-outweigh the restrictions on the rights of juveniles. -In the voting area, the conse-
quences of an unwise decision fall on society generally. In the other examples, it is 
the child himself who is being protected from the irrevocable future consequences 
of a rash act. Although a foolish adult will continue to be foolish, a foolish child 
will likely outgrow his foolishness. Thus, limitations on the freedom of the child, 
but not the foolish adult, are justifiable. 
114. The I.Q. scale, for example, measures the ratio of intellectual to chronologi-
cal age. See E. PEEL, TuE NATURE OF AnoLESCENT JUDGMENT (1971). Peel's experi-
ments dealt with the development of intellectual judgment, but he notes the relevance 
of I.Q. to moral judgment as well. See also J. ARONFREED, CoNDUCT AND CON• 
SCIENCE 266 (1968), which states that older children are capable of greater "cog-
nitive and verbal complexity which they can use to integrate their social experi-
ence." Thus, they can evalµate choices "in terms of broader principles of social 
desirability or obligations" rather than "immediate consequences for the action." Id. 
at 272. 
It has been argued, however, that the relevant criterion is maturity, not age, and 
thus that individual adjudications where the state must prove "demonstrable inca-
pacity to make acceptable use of the opportunity in question" are required to justify 
restrictions on the freedom of minors. Tribe, supra note 106, at 12. Nevt:rtheless, 
the data suggest that differences between children and adults are sufficiently wide-
spread to support the age generalization. Furthermore, ours is a system of laws-
all of which involve imperfect categorization-and individualized determinations are 
simply impractical in the context of a broad law such as a curfew. 
115. The law already recognizes the significance of capacity and knowledge to 
the genuine exercise of rights. Certain constitutional rights-e.g., not to be a witness 
against oneself, to be free from search without a warrant, to a jury trial, and to coun-
sel-may be waived. Such waivers are void, however, unless there was informed con-
sent. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 
332 U.S. 703 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). But see Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 4112 U.S. 218 (1973). Cf. Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale 
for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 MICH. L. RBV. 
1214 (1977) (suggesting that no rights are permanently forfeited, even by a knowing, 
intelligent waiver, unless the state is significantly disadvantaged by the waiver). To 
be sure, these cases are concerned with an individual's capacity to waive rather than 
assert rights. The right to represent oneself in a criminal trial, however, may not 
be asserted unless the defendant is at least literate, although he need not possess 
technical legal skills. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975). 
116. For the basic study of the child's maturation process, see J. PIAGET, THB 
MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 401-04 (1932). He posits three inevitably sequen-
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The second component of maturation relevant to the exercise of 
the freedom of movement, adolescent conformity, intensifies the 
problems created by diminished judgmental capacity. Studies show 
that young adolescents are more responsive to peer pressures than 
are younger or older persons.117 This tendency toward conformity 
is particularly significant in determining the scope of the right to 
freedom of movement. Juveniles are not- yet capable of mature 
moral judgments, and yet they are heavily influenced by their peers. 
Granting them total freedom to wander about with their companions 
encourages the formation of delinquent subcultures118 that are not 
merely dysfunctional for society as a whole, but are dysfunctional 
for their members as well. The combination of diminished judg-
mental capacity and relatively high susceptibility to peer pressure re-
lates directly to the exercise by juveniles of freedom of movement 
and justifies the conclusion that the right to this freedom can be 
limited for juveniles in a manner that would be unconstitutional if 
applied to adults. 
tial stages of judgmental development: egocentrism, where rules are mere rituals to 
please the child; authority, or heteronomy, where the child obeys rules because they 
are laid down by others; and autonomy, where rules are obeyed because they seem 
right. In the first transition-from egocentrism to heteronomy-"the mind stops af-
firming what it likes to affirm and falls in with the opinion of those around it." Id. 
at 401. In the second transition, "[h]eteronomy steps aside to make way for a con-
sciousness of good, of which the autonomy results from the acceptance of the idea 
of justice." Id. at 404. Several researchers have since confirmed his thesis and 
shown that the third stage is not generally reached until late adolescence. See gen-
-erally J. HORROCKS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AnoLESCENCE 557 (3d ed. 1969); A. KAY, 
MORAL DEVELOPMENT 173 ff (1968); Kohlberg, Moral Development and the Educa-
tion of Adolescents, in AooLESCENTS: READINGS IN BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT (E. 
Evons ed. 1970). See also Comment, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a Separ-
ate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 984, 1011 (1976). 
These studies also suggest that Mill was correct in excepting children from his 
libertarian thesis. See J. MILL, supra note 93, at 11. If a person is not yet mature 
enough to know what he wants for himself, then he cannot have freedom, but only 
the illusion of freedom. 
Although the unique characteristics of juveniles that justify curfews may not be 
inherent, but rather might be "created" by a modern industrial society that delays 
the natural development of the child, see Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Con-
ceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39(3) LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 
38, 63 (Summer 1975), it remains true that teenagers in 20th century America are 
not yet fully adult. See generally P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (R. Boldick 
trans. 1962). 
117. See Castanzo & Shaw, Conformity as a Function of Age Level, in READINGS 
IN AnoLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR (J. !tell & J. Shelton eds. 1971); 
Query, The Influence of Group Pressures on the Judgments of Children and Adoles-
cents-A Comparative Study, 3 AnoLESCENCE 153 (1969). 
That younger children are not as susceptible to peer pressure might suggest that 
the scope of their freedom of movement should not be thus limited, but their even 
weaker judgmental capacity, see note 116 supra, counters this suggestion. 
118. See, e.g., A. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY & OPPORTUNITY (1960). 
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C. Countervailing Governmental Interests 
Having concluded that juvenile rights to freedom of movement 
are weaker than the corresponding rights of adults, it follows from 
the balancing test applicable to freedom of movement110 that govern-
mental interests need not be as strong to justify a juvenile curfew 
as to justify a general curfew imposed upon adults.120 These gov-
ernmental interests will now be examined to determine whether they 
are sufficient to warrant the limitations on freedom of movement that 
a juvenile curfew entails. 
The governmental interests that have traditionally been ad-
vanced to justify juvenile curfews fall into three general categories: 
protecting the community from juvenile crime and noncriminal mis-
chief; protecting juveniles from harm beyond their control, such as 
crime or accidents, and from delinquency-inducing situations; and 
reinforcing parental authority. If enforced, a juvenile curfew would 
undoubtedly inhibit the nocturnal activities of juveniles and thus be 
expected to protect the community from typical juvenile mischief121 
as well as from more serious crime and juvenile gang activity.122 
119. See text at notes 80-83 supra. 
120. The separation made in the text between the legitimate scope of the juve-
nile's right to freedom of movement and the countervailing governmental interests 
is somewhat artificial. Individual rights do not exist in the abstract, but rather are 
defined in terms of limitations on legitimate governmental interests. Therefore, to 
assert that juveniles have a less extensive right to freedom of movement relative to 
adults may be considered equivalent to saying that the legitimate governmental inter-
ests in restricting the movement of minors are greater, That individual rights and 
governmental interests are two sides of the same coin has been implicitly recognized 
by one commentator in the context of the juvenile's right to sexual privacy. In criti-
cizing the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Planned Parenthood Assn., 29 
Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d' 75, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 414 U.S. 805 (1973) 
(upholding parental consent requirements in the sale of contraceptives to minors), 
the author of Note, supra note 106, suggests that "[t]he court might still have con-
cluded that opposing state, parental, and family interests justified limiting minor's 
access to contraceptives, either by narrowing the scope of the minor's privacy right 
or by constituting concerns sufficiently compelling to warrant dilferential treatment." 
Id, at 1011 n.73 (emphasis added). 
121. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 
1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted at 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 964 (1976), in which the local police chief testified that the principal com-
plaints received concerning juveniles' activities during nighttime hours concerned 
"vandalism, prowling, loud noise, and disorderly conduct." 401 F. Supp. at 1255. 
122. The preamble to the 1976 Detroit juvenile curfew ordinance justifies the 
ordinance as follows: 
WHEREAS, there has been a dramatic increase in vandalism, robberies, 
assaults, batteries and other such crimes in the City of Detroit brought about 
by large numbers of roving, lawless minors, and 
WHEREAS, there is need for effectively governing the conduct of such 
minors in the City of Detroit for the purpose of alleviating and eliminating these 
problems brought about by these large numbers of roving, lawless minors, and 
WHEREAS, the citizens of Detroit urgently need protection from these rov-
ing, lawles!'> minors . • • • 
Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 18, 1976, DBTROIT, MICH., 1976 JOURNAL OF TIIB CITY 
CoUNCIL 1677-78. 
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Hence the imposition of a juvenile curfew would seemingly promote 
the first governmental interest. 
This interest alone might appear sufficient to justify a juvenile 
curfew, given that the right to freedom of movement is weaker for 
minors than for adults because of the former's immaturity and its 
supposed consequences. The argument might be made, however, 
that any deprivation of this right should be justified only where the 
governmental interest asserted to offset it is demonstrably related to 
the immaturity of minors. Unless it can be related to the special 
characteristics of children, the interest in protecting the community 
from crime-an interest insufficient to justify imposition of a general 
curfew123-would be insufficient to justify a juvenile curfew .124 
Were this nexus required, the governmental interest in protect-
ing the community from crime might be considered to be at least 
indirectly related to certain characteristics of minors: immaturity, 
with its attendant diminished judgmental capacity and greater sub-
missiveness to peer pressure, makes more likely the perpetration of 
certain crimes by juveniles. Teenagers do, in fact, have a higher 
crime rate than adults, particularly with respect to spur-of-the-
moment crimes, such as vandalism, that might be prevented by a 
curfew.125 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the courts would require such a 
nexus between the governmental interest sought to be protected and 
the special characteristics of minors. Courts generally are reluctant 
to engage in "motive review,m26 and thus, even if the actual motive 
for imposing a juvenile curfew were to protect the community from 
crime127 and the relationship between juvenile immaturity and com-
123. Unless the rate of criminal activity were to reach drastic levels sufficient to 
constitute an emergency, a general curfew aimed at protecting the community from 
crime could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. See text at note 20 supra. 
124. For example, assume that a municipality had a legitimate interest in re-
lieving pedestrian congestion in a certain section of town. The argument in the text 
suggests that, even though the scope of the right to freedom of movement for minors 
is less than for adults, the municipality could not prohibit the presence of children 
on the relevant streets if the distinguishing characteristics of minors did not create 
any greater propensity to cause congestion. As this example illustrates, the suggested 
analysis resembles an equal protection approach. For a discussion of the validity of 
juvenile curfews under an equal protection analysis, see text at notes 137-55 infra. 
125. In 1975, for example, those aged under 18 constituted 23.1 % of all persons 
arrested nationally for violent crimes, 48.0% for serious crimes and 65.4% for van-
dalism. U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1975, at 188, table 36. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 
401 F. Supp. 1242, 1255-56 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unreported opinion noted in 
535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). The effectiveness of 
curfews in preventing or reducing juvenile crime, however, is uncertain. See notes 
14-15 supra and accompanying text. 
126. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); note 87 supra. 
127. Protecting the community from juvenile crime was undoubtedly the domin-
ant factor in the adoption of the Detroit curfew. See note 122 supra. 
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munity protection were too indirect to justify the curfew, the restric-
tions would be upheld provided that other governmental interests 
that are closely related to the distinctive characteristics of minors 
could be posited. Prevention of juvenile delinquency, which will 
be discussed below in connection with protection of juveniles, is one 
such interest. 
The second category of governmental interests promoted by a 
juvenile curfew is the protection of minors, both from delinquency 
and from harm beyond their control. Protecting minors from be-
coming victims of crime or accident, 128 though a laudable govern-
mental purpose, is to some extent subject to the criticism earlier 
directed toward the interest of protecting the community from 
juvenile mischief and criminal activity: the interest would appear 
to support a more general curfew. Although the special nature of 
minors is generally thought to give the state, as parens patriae, 120 
128. Although it may seem incongruous to limit someone's rights in order to pro-
tect him from the misbehavior of others, courts have upheld laws that attempt to do 
precisely that. See Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974), and Warshafsky v. The Journal Company, 63 Wis. 
2d 130, 216 N.W.2d 197 (1974), each of which upheld restrictions on the activities 
of young females but not males on the ground that such women needed special state 
protection against criminal sexual assault. Cf. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 257.658(d) 
(Supp. 1977) (requiring motorcycle operators and passengers to wear crash helmets). 
129. Parens patriae is defined as "the sovereign power of guardianship [of the 
State] over persons under disability ... such as minors." BLACK'S LAW DrcrroNARY 
1269 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
Most of the current discussion of the parens patriae doctrine has appeared in the 
context of the juvenile court system. The justification for the system and the special 
procedures it employs, often at the expense of many of the rights associated with 
adult criminal trials, has been that juvenile proceedings are designed "not to punish, 
but to save the child" through rehabilitation. In re Winship, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 299 
N.Y.S.2d 414, 247 N.E.2d 253 (1969), revd., 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See Fox, Juve-
nile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L REV. 1187 (1970); 
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909); Rendleman, Parens Pa-
triae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205 (1971). 
In a series of recent decisions holding several elements of the juvenile justice sys-
tem unconstitutional, the Court ruled that juveniles are entitled to the basic due pro-
cess procedural guarantees, but, significantly, it refused to accord them the full 
· panoply of rights granted adults. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 
(1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
This denial of full procedural protection to juveniles is justified if we conclude 
that the juvenile justice system is intended to be rehabilitative. The system is an• 
alytically distinguishable from the adult criminal system, in which the state could not 
constitutionally substitute better rehabilitation for due process rights of the defendant. 
To a large extent the difference reflects the different theoretical bases of the juvenile 
and adult criminal systems. We presume that adults have free will and reason and 
thus can be punished for their criminal acts. Children lack full capacity for free 
will and reason, and thus their behavior is to a far greater extent determined by their 
environment, which suggests that the proper corrective response is rehabilitation 
rather than punishment. See Faust, A Perspective on the Dilemma of Free Will and 
Determinism in Juvenile Justice, 25 Juv. JUST. 54 (1974). However, if the juvenile 
justice system is not fulfilling its rehabilitative role, then the justification for granting 
juveniles less than full due process rights fails. That is, if the treatment for a juvenile 
adjudged delinquent fulfills only the functions of deterrence and prevention, the 
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a legitimate interest in protecting them that does not apply to 
adults, 130 not all of the characteristics that make minors more likely 
victims of crime are unique to children. Thus, the aim of protecting 
potential victims of nocturnal crime and misadventure would also 
support a curfew aimed at other citizens, such as the elderly, who, 
like children, are generally physically less capable of defending 
themselves than are most adults.131 Immaturity is related in some 
ways to protecting minors from external harm, however, for the 
diminished judgmental capacity of minors might lead them to expose 
themselves to unreasonable risk of harm if left to their own choice. 
The second component of the governmental interest in protect-
ing juveniles-preventing delinquency-is even more directly re-
lated to the special characteristics of minors. By applying a noctur-
nal curfew to restrict the freedom of movement of juveniles, the state 
is merely recognizing that, if juveniles are allowed to roam about 
freely at all hours of the night, the combination of diminished judg-
mental capacity and responsiveness to peer pressure can produce a 
pattern of delinquent behavior.132 Unlike those adults who have 
settled into a life of crime, mischievous juveniles will often outgrow 
their antisocial behavior patterns if they are prevented from engag-
ing in rash acts with irrevocable consequences and from initiating 
an escalating pattern of criminal activity.133 . 
The final justification that can be advanced for juvenile curfews 
is that of reinforcing parental authority. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that "[t]he legislature could properly conclude that 
primary emphases of the adult system, then the juvenile should have coextensive 
means to avoid such punishment. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-27 (1967) (sug-
gesting that due process would not inhibit the rehabilitative features of the juvenile 
court, while also expressing doubt abgut the reality of rehabilitation). 
130. This special interest is based on the same peculiar characteristics of juveniles 
that justify according them lesser rights. See notes 92-108 supra and accompanying 
text. Thus, Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), affd. sub nom. Gerstein 
v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976), notes that the issue of minors' abortions can be an-
alyzed in terms of whether "(1) all fundamental rights apply to minors, but the state 
may sometimes assert an interest sufficient to justify the state action; or (2) minors 
do not necessarily have all of the fundamental rights of adults." 517 F.2d at 790. 
Since the Court has required a compelling interest to justify invasion of fundamental 
rights, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the facts distinguishing 
juveniles from adults are often not so unassailable as to rise to the "compelling" level, 
there are major practical differences between the two methods of analysis. 
131. Cf. Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974) (upholding dormitory curfew applicable only to women 
students partly on the ground "that women are more likely to be criminally attacked 
later at night and are physically less capable of defending themselves than men"). 
132. See text at notes 114-18 supra. 
133. In this respect a juvenile curfew reflects the basic assumptions underlying 
the juvenile justice system. See Stiller & Elder, PINS-A Concept in Need of Super-
vision, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 33, 34-35 (1974). But cf. Fox, supra note· 129, at 
1193 (rejecting involuntary rehabilitation of juveniles). 
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parents and others . . who have this primary responsibility for chil-
dren's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid 
discharge of that responsibility."134 A curfew ordinance reinforces 
the authority of parents to impose curfews on their children and, by 
ensuring that children are at home in the evenings, may ultimately 
strengthen family unity. Even where a juvenile curfew infringes 
upon parental child-rearing decisions, the countervailing governmen-
tal interests are sufficient to justify this interference.1311 
134. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). 
The State is not powerless to prevent or control situations which threaten the 
proper functioning of a family unit as an important segment of the total society, 
It may properly extend the protection of its laws in aid of the head of a family 
unit whose reasonable and lawful commands are being disobeyed by children 
who are bound to obey them. 
Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,557,270 N.E.2d 389, 394 (1971). 
Many states supplement parental authority by granting juvenile courts jurisdiction 
over a minor who "has deserted his home without sufficient cause or who is repeat• 
edly disobedient to the reasonable and lawful commands of his parents," MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 712A.2(a) (2) (1970), or "is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually 
disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority," N.Y, 
JUD. LAW § 712(b) (McKinney 1963). Thus, the state appears ready to step in if 
necessary, but family control of children is preferred. 
135. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1264 (M.D. 
Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) ("[t]he parents' constitutionally protected interest with 
respect to the upbringing of their children, upon which the ordinance infringes only 
minimally, is outweighed by the borough's interest in protecting immature minors and 
in controlling and preventing nocturnal juvenile mischief and crime"). 
Like a compulsory school attendance law, a curfew serves to reinforce the wishes 
, of most parents. Some parents, however, may prefer to give their children more in-
dependence, and in those instances the law does interfere with parental judgment. 
However, although the parents have the primary authority for raising their children, 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), when they are not acting to 
further the child's best interests, "[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth's 
well being, the state as parens patriae may res.trict the parent's control by requiring 
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other 
ways." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
The Supreme Court, however, may be hesitant to uphold, in the name of reinforc-
ing parental authority, a regulation attempting to replace parental judgment entirely 
with society's judgment. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 708 
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part on the ground that, by prohibiting parents 
from distributing contraceptives to their children, the statute unjustifiably interfered 
with parental interests in rearing their children). And, since parents are generally 
in a better position to respond to the individualized needs of their children, any major 
disruptions of the parent-child relationship, such as removal from custody, would be 
subject to "rigorous testing of the basis of any claim for benevolent state interven• 
tion." Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of 
Wyman v. lames, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1293 (1971). See also Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
In the final analysis, perhaps a curfew can be designed that would recognize both 
the state's interest and the parent's interest in supervising the child. The parent is 
certainly in a better position to evaluate her child's actual level of maturity, and thus 
possibly a curfew should apply only to children who are out beyond certain specific 
hours without parental consent. A recognition of the importance of the state regu-
latory interest and of the gross disparity between the societal norm of parental 
supervision and the actual supervision by some parents, however, would require that 
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In conclusion, the governmental interests in protecting the 
community from juvenile mischief and crime, protecting minors from 
potential delinquency and harm beyond their control, and reinforcing 
parental authority generally outweigh the relatively limited rights of 
children to freedom of movement. Thus, juvenile curfews are not 
per se unconstitutional under the ninth amendment balancing test. 136 
D. Juvenile Curfews and Equal Protection 
Since juvenile curfews. clearly discriminate against minors, they 
also raise an equal protection issue that is distinguishable from any 
ninth amendment claim. In determining whether state action 
violates the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has articu-
lated two essentially distinct tests. Under one test, a statutory classi-
fication must be upheld if the scheme bears a "rational relationship" 
to the ends sought to be achieved.137 If, however, the state action 
creates a "suspect" grouping138 or infringes upon a "fundamental" 
right,139 the governmental interest advanced by the state action must 
be "compelling" in order to pass constitutional scrutiny.140 In addi-
tion, several cases have suggested an intermediate level of scrutiny 
that would require that, although the state need not show that the 
classification furthers a compelling state interest, it proves that the 
classification used actually furthers the asserted state purposes.141 
the ordinance specify various combinations of ages and hours beyond which the 
state's interest would override parental consent. Some precedent for such an ordin-
ance can be found in statutes specifying the age at which an individual can marry, 
with marriage permissible at a somewhat lower age if consented to by the parents. 
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 55al02 (1975); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 551.103 (1977). 
136. Because this Note uses a balancing rather than an absolutist model (where 
the determination that a constitutional right is involved ends the analysis), the extent 
of the infringement and the strength of the government interest advanced are rele-
vant to the decision on constitutionality. 
137. This is a very easy standard for the government to meet, since a "statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). See Williamson 
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
138. Race is universally accepted as one suspect classification: "all legal restric-
tions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect." 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Alienage, Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), and national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 
U.S. 633, 644-46 (11948), have also been designated as inherently suspect classes. 
139. Among rights deemed fundamental are interstate movement, Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969); procreation, Skinner v. OklahoI!}a, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942); and access to the judicial prgcess, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 
17 (1956). 
140. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In no case since Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Japanese exclusion case, has the Court 
found that the compelling state interest standard was met. 
141. In the illegitimacy case of Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), the Court 
said that the test "is whether the line drawn is a rational .one. . . . However that 
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The age classification embodied in juvenile curfews rests on real and 
substantial differences between adults and minors that clearly bear 
a rational relationship to the purposes of these ordinances.142 Thus, 
juvenile curfews certainly meet the minimal-and probably meet the 
intermediate-equal protection test of constitutionality. 148 The 
governmental interests promoted by curfews are generally not suffi-
cient, however, to constitute a "compelling state interest,"144 and 
thus a juvenile curfew would be unconstitutional if it relied upon a 
suspect classification or infringed upon a fundamental interest. 
On a superficial level, age does appear similar to the suspect or 
semi-suspect classifications of race, 145 illegitimacy, 146 sex, 147 and 
alienage:148 it is a personal trait over which the individual has no 
control.149 The reason for carefully scrutinizing laws that discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, sex, or alienage is that these categories, 
though frequently used in the past, rarely bear any substantial rela-
tionship to the legitimate purposes of legislation.1110 Strict scrutiny 
might be, we have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights .•.. " 
391 U.S. at 71. A similar approach is discernible in the sex discrimination case of 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), 
which upheld the right of unmarried people to use contraceptives. Cf. Stanton v. 
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1975) (declining to decide whether classification based 
on sex is inherently suspect since line drawn was not "rational"). The problems with 
and potential of this intermediate level of scrutiny are examined in Gunther, The 
Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); 
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee: 
Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. LJ. 1071 (1974); Note, 
Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). 
142. Several cases have dealt with the equal protection challenge to juvenile cur-
fews. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1264-66 
(M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); In re C, 28 Cal. App. 3d 747, 105 Cal. Rptr. 
113 (1972); People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 862, 867-68, 161 P.2d 498, 
501 (1945). 
143. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1265 (M.D. 
Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). 
144. In emergency situations such as times of riot, however, the state interest 
with respect to adults as well as minors might be sufficient to be considered "compel• 
ling." See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
145. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
146. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
147. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
148. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
149. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV, t1065, 
1126-27 (1969). 
150. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Court, in a plurality 
opinion, explained that "what differentiates sex from . • . nonsuspect statuses • • • 
and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic fre-
quently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." 411 U.S. 
at 686. 
November 1977] Juvenile Curfew Ordinances 139 
reflects a judicial distrust of any law that uses such classifications.151 
On the other hand, although age is also a common basis for classi-
fication, it is not an irrational one. Because significari.t differences 
in judgment and maturity justify most of the discriminations against 
minors, 152 age is not-and should not be-a suspect classification.153 
State action also requires a compelling justification if it infringes 
upon a fundamental interest. Although freedom of movement 
might well be a fundamental interest for adults,154 it is not a funda-
mental right for children.155 Consequently, a juvenile curfew should 
be upheld in the face of an equal protection challenge to its consti-
tutionality. 
II. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF JUVENILE CURFEWS 
Because courts and legislatures must deal with particular 
ordinances, they must look beyond the facial constitutionality of 
juvenile curfews in order to determine whether the specific provi-
151. Ely suggests that the choice of suspect classifications is based on "we-they" 
discriminations, with "we" being those in control of the legislative process. Ely, The 
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974). 
Although juveniles are not themselves represented in legislatures, legislators are not 
separated from and possibly antagonistic to them in the way they might be_ toward 
blacks, aliens, or the illegitimate, and, therefore, in this respect juveniles do not 
qualify as a suspect class. 
152. See generally text at notes 92-118 supra. Of course, if there is no connec-
tion between the benefit or burden of the law and the special characteristics of 
minors, then an age-based classification would be unconstitutional even under the ra-
tional basis test. See, e.g., Morales v. Minter, 393 F. Supp. 88 (D. Mass. 1975) 
(striking down a law limiting general welfare benefits to those aged over 18). 
153. Often one of the characteristics of a suspect classification is the stigmatiza-
tion it imposes on the members of that class. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Treating juveniles differently from adults does arguably 
"stigmatize" them, but this factor would be insufficient to require a compelling state 
interest. Our culture already applies special treatment to juveniles in many ways, in-
cluding such clearly necessary legal distinctions as compulsory education, contractual 
incapacity, and the denial of voting rights; thus the marginal stigmatic effect of a 
curfew law is minimal. Children also grow out of being children, so that the stigma 
is less personal. Moreover, even though the stigma argument seems stronger for dis-
crimination against the old, the Supreme Court, in Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), declared that age was not a classification re-
quiring strict scrutiny and thus that a state could mandate retirement of police at 
age SO under the rational basis test. 
154. See text at notes 20-22 supra: 
155. See text at notes 109-18 supra. A parallel might be drawn to the right to 
vote, which, although a fundamental interest, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), may be denied to those below a certain age, cf. Oregon 
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (invalidating portion of the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970 lowering the' voting age to 18 in state and local elections). 
Again, the interest is fundamental only to a limited group of people. But cf. Ros-
berg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Rig~t To Vote?, 15 MICH. L. REv. 
1092 (1977) (asserting that no persuasive argument exists to support the denial of 
voting rights to permanent resident aliens). 
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sions156 of a given curfew are so unreasonably restrictive that the 
ordinance is unconstitutional. Curfew ordinances may vary with 
respect to at least five specific types of provisions: age limits, time 
limits, exceptions provided, sanctions imposed, and whether the 
ordinance prohibits "being" or "loitering" on the streets. Excessive 
strictness in one or more of these areas may lead a court to find an 
ordinance unconstitutional.157 Since neither the necessity nor the 
effectiveness of curfews has been conclusively demonstrated, 1118 a 
legislature should strike the balance more strongly in favor of indi-
vidual liberties than is constitutionally required, as suggested in the 
Model Curfew Ordinance set forth in the Appendix. 
The curfew ordinances that have been challenged in the courts 
have had maximum age limits ranging from sixteen159 to twenty-one 
years, 160 with the most common upper age limit being eighteen.161 
A legislative body should give careful consideration to the maxi-
mum age to which the ordinance should apply, for, as the age 
limit increases, the child's interests in freedom of movement strengthen 
while the municipality's regulatory interests weaken. A seven-
teen-year-old has a stronger interest in going to a movie, a social 
activity, or a sporting event in the evening than a thirteen-year-
old. Concurrently, the increasing maturity that comes with age 
lessens,the legitimate concerns about the minor's incapacity for wise 
decisionmaking and vulnerability to peer pressures.162 In addition, 
curfews with high age limits no longer clearly serve to reinforce 
parental authority, 103 for at some point the parents' concern with 
training their children for independent decisionmaking begins to out-
156. When specific curfew provisions are discussed in this Note, they will usually 
be cited to the cases in which they were challenged, since municipal code books are 
not generally available. 
151. See, e.g., Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 
(11957); Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). 
The constitutionality of various curfew provisions is quite unclear. The Supreme 
Court's denial of certiorari in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 
(M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976), postponed any conclusive ruling on the merits of 
curfews. The many state court cases, see, e.g., cases cited supra, because they start 
from different assumptions both about the general equal protection and due process 
issues discussed in the text at notes 88-155 supra and about the appropriate level of 
deference to legislative judgments, do not present any coherent pattern in their 
treatment of ordinances of varying strictness. 
158. Cf. note 14 supra an~ accompanying text (discussing Detroit situation). 
159. See Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971): 
Baker v. Borough of Steelton, 17 Dauphin County Rep. 17 (Pa. 1912). 
160. See Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate for Ocean City, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 
688 (1964); Ex parte Mccarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). 
161. See Note, •107 U. PA. L. REV. 66, supra note 16, at 70. 
162. See text at notes 114-18 supra. 
163. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text. 
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weigh their interest in shielding the children from possible adverse 
influences.164 
Although the relevant criterion for determining the group to 
which curfews should apply is really maturity, 165 which of course will 
vary greatly among persons of the same age, an ordinance must draw 
a precise age line somewhere.166 The choice, within very broad 
limits, is a matter for legislative discretion.167 None of the court de-
cisions dealing with juvenile curfews has focused directly on the 
legitimacy of the age limits chosen, although the limits selected may 
be one element in the judicial balancing. Any limit higher than 
eighteen would be difficult to justify, since eighteen is the voting age 
specified in the twenty-sixth amendment to the Constitution168 and is 
the maximum age used in most other statutes limiting the rights of 
minors.169 Since the age limit for juvenile court jurisdiction170 is 
based on very similar considerations of immaturity and impression-
ability, it would seem reasonable to use the same age for the upper 
limit in a juvenile curfew, as the Model Curfew Ordinance set forth 
-in the Appendix has done. No one should be deemed too mature 
164. One of the concerns of the Detroit ACLU is the undercutting of parental 
authority by the curfew, since under it parents are no longer free to determine the 
timing of their children's shift to independence. Interview with Paul Harbrecht, 
Director of Detroit ACLU, in Detroit (Oct. 19, 1976) (on file at the Michigan Law 
Review). 
165. See notes 113-18 supra and accompanying text. 
166. Any attempt to measure maturity more directly-by psychological testing, 
for example-would be both administratively unworkable and a substantial invasion 
of privacy. 
Cases such as Morales v. Minter, 393 F. Supp. 88 (D. Mass. 1975), overturning 
a rule denying general welfare benefits to persons aged under 18, are inapposite. As 
the Morales court stated, "[t]his case must be distinguished from those in which in-
dividuals were classified according to subjective expectancies of maturity to perform 
a certain function . . . . In those cases a line, however subjective, had to be drawn 
somewhere. In this case, the drawing of any line, without reason, cannot stand." 
393 F. Supp. at 100 n.17 (emphasis original). 
167. Cf. Perdido v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 420 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 
1969) (finding reasonable a statute limiting to citizens over 2'1 the right to have their 
parents reside in the United States). 
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
169. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-46-112 (1976) (prohibiting sale of alcoholic 
beverages to those below the age of 18); IowA CooE ANN. § 47.4(1) (West Supp. 
1977) (voting age 18). But see Thistlewood v. Ocean City, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 
688 (1964), the only 20th century case construing a curfew with an age limit as high 
as 21. In upholding .the curfew, the court said that "Maryland has recognized, as 
have other states, that the activities and conduct of those under twenty-one may be 
regulated and restricted to a far greater extent than those of adults." 236 Md. at 
557, 204 A.2d at 693. The·trend toward an 18-year age limit has accelerated since 
1964. 
170. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 712A.2 (1970) (setting age limit at 17); 
N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1976) (setting age for juvenile de-
linquency at 16; for persons in need of court supervision- at 16 for males, 18 for 
females). 
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for the rehabilitative effects of the juvenile court and yet too 
immature to be allowed outside alone at night. 
The time limits between which a curfew is imposed also require 
precise, if somewhat arbitrary, delineation.171 The curfews that 
have been subject to judicial examination began between 9:00 p.m. 
and midnight. 172 Curfews generally are lifted at "daylight" or at a 
specified hour such as 6:00 a.m.173 The setting of time limits, like 
that of age limits, is a legislative determination requiring a careful 
balancing of interests. If the limit is set too early, it will interfere 
with minors' attendance at commercial affairs such as plays or sport-
ing events and make the scheduling of church and school affairs 
difficult. Data on when juvenile crime is committed might suggest 
a natural time around which a curfew could be structured.1 u 
Some ordinances have recognized that maturation is a continuous 
· process by setting later time limits for older juveniles. 175 Although 
staggered age and time limits make the curfew more responsive to 
the changing interests of both the individual and the municipality, 
they also increase the difficulty of enforcement.176 Consequently, 
the Model Curfew Ordinance suggested by this Note provides a 
single time limit applicable to all ages, 177 relying upon explicit excep-
tions178 rather than staggered age and time limits to accommodate 
the legitimate interests of older juveniles. 
A third element of curfew ordinances, whether they prohibit 
"being" or "loitering" on the streets, has received explicit judicial 
· attention. Some courts have found ordinances unconstitutionally 
171. See Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976). In that 
case, the Second Circuit was able to avoid the other constitutional issues presented 
since "[t]he failure to provide the hour at which the curfew ends, makes the ordi-
nance void for vagueness." 545 F.2d at 818. 
172. See Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66, supra note 16, at 71. 
173. Id. 
174. The author could not find such material in published sources. Since most 
major city police departments have access to computer facilities, it would be relatively 
simple for them to generate the necessary data and thus enable the city to tailor its 
ordinance more precisely to local needs. 
175. The curfew upheld in City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 220 
N.E.2d 126 (1966), set hours of darkness to dawn for children under 12, 11 :00 p.m. 
to 6:00 a.m. for children between 12 and 16, and 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. for children 
between 16 and 18. The Detroit ordinance in effect before August 1976 was par-
ticularly intricate. It set hours of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. for children under 12, 
11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. for those between 12 and 14, and 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. 
for 15- and 16-year olds, with an extension until 1 :00 a.m. for the latter on Friday 
and Saturday. The ordinance also set different, stricter hours (also varying by age) 
for the time when children were required to be out of theatres, bowling alleys, and 
other places of amusement. DETROIT, MICH., CI1Y CODE §§ 36-3-1 to -2 (amended 
by Emergency Ordinance of Aug. 18, 1976, § 1, DETROIT, MICH., 1976 JOURNAL OP 
THE Cl1Y COUNCIL 1677-78). 
176. See Note, 107 U. PA. L REV. 66, supra note 16, at 71-72. 
177. See the Appendix infra. 
178. See text at notes 184-98 infra. 
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vague ( for using "loitering") or overbroad ( for using "being") , 179 
but the better view, articulated in recent cases, is that this factor is 
without practical significance.180 To avoid the ~oncern courts have 
expressed over the vagueness of "loitering" language in vagrancy 
cases181 and because the inclusion of numerous exceptions will elimi-
ate much of the concern with overbreadth that has accompanied the 
use of "being" language,182 the Model Curfew Ordinance suggested 
by this Note makes it unlawful for juveniles to "be •in or upon any 
public street . . . or other public place" during specified hours.183 
The greatest difficulty in designing an effective yet constitution-
ally acceptable curfew ordinance lies in specifying the exceptions 
that are to be provided. An ordinance that is so general that it pro-
hibits too much innocent behavior might well fail to survive constitu-
tional scrutiny.184 Courts upholding ordinances have found that the 
exceptions to the general prohibition of nocturnal activity were suffi-
ciently broad to protect most innocent behavior.185 The exceptions 
179. The court in Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1971 ), held that the word "loitering" is unconstitutionally vague because it is unclear 
how long one must be on the streets to come under its proscription. ·Furthermore, 
it has been said that "being" language, which might cover the most brief and harm-
less incident, is defectively overbroad. See Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 
419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957). Yet it is difficult to conceive of language that does not 
suffer to some extent from one of these two defects, since in many areas, such as 
traffic laws, the law cannot be precisely delimited only to conduct that is in fact dan-
gerous. 
180. Se.e, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 
(M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). See also Note, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 66, supra note 
16, at 73. 
181. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
182. See Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957). 
183. See the Appendix infra. 
184. See Seattle v. ·Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 799, 514 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 
( 1973) ( one of the criticisms or an invalid curfew was that its four exceptions were 
"not exhaustive and fail[ed] to account for the many other possible 'innocent' acts"); 
Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 424, 306 P.2d 601, 605 (1957) (curfew 
struck down as "an arbitrary invasion" of "inherent personal rights and liberties" be-
cause its broad prohibitions would make unlawful such innocent behavior as atten-
dance at dances, church, theater, and sporting events bearing no rational relationship 
to the purposes of the statute). Accord, In re Doe, 54 Hawaii 647, 513 P.2d 1385 
(1973); Ex parte Mccarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). See also 
Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974, 980 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) ("to forbid 
people from being on public streets as a preventive measure rings of a totalitarian 
police state operated for the efficiency of the government and not in the interests 
of a free people"). 
185. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 
1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 964 (1976); In re C, 28 Cal. App. 3d 747, 757, 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121 
(1972). Bykofsky upheld a curfew that "contains numerous exceptions that allow 
minors to be on the streets during the curfew hours when they have a specific, impor-
tant, legitimate purpose for being there." 401 F. Supp. at 1256. In addition, the ordi-
nance made special provision for binding mayoral advisory opinions with respect to 
the official interpretation of the ordinance, a provision the court relied on in part 
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must be carefully drawn, however, in order to avoid opening loop-
holes or making the ordinance too complex to administer fairly. 
Juvenile curfew ordinances generally make an exception for 
children accompanied by a parent, guardian, or other responsible 
adult, although wide variation exists in the language used to delimit 
the category of responsible adults.186 To be effective, an ordinance 
should avoid treating a nineteen-year-old ringleader as a "respon-
sible adult" accompanying a gang of fifteen-year-olds.187 In addi-
tion, since one purpose of a curfew is reinforcement of parental con-
trol, an ordinance should require that the exception applies only if 
the child's parent or guardian has authorized the adult to accompany 
the child, either generally or for a particular occasion. The 
legitimacy of the parental approval could be verified when the 
parents are called to take the child home after a suspected viola-
tion.1ss 
Other exceptions are generally made for children involved in 
what the legislature determines to be legitimate, innocent activi-
ties.189 One of the more common exceptions applies to children 
in holding that the curfew was not unconstitutionally vague. 401 F. Supp. at 1248, 
1252. 
186. E.g., City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 213, 220 N.E. 2d 
126, 127 (1966) ("accompanied by a parent, guardian or some responsible person 
over the age of twenty-one (21) years, or a member of his family eighteen (18) years 
or older"); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-47 (M.D. 
Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) ("adult authorized by the parent to take the parent's 
place in accompanying the minor"); DETROIT, MICH., CilY CODE § 36-3-5 (1976) 
("other adult having the care or custody of the minor"). 
187. Regardless of the particular language employed, however, the police enforc-
ing such ordinances generally make their own determinations about the maturity of 
the accompanying adult. If the accompanying adult is of "parental" age or de-
meanor, the police are unlikely to stop the youth. If the adult seems to be very 
young or does not appear to be exercising care over the minor, the police may suspect 
a curfew violation. The common practice upon a suspected curfew violation, whether 
contained in the ordinance, see 2A T. MATIHEWS & B. MATTHEWS, MUNICIPAL 
ORDINANCES § 40.39 (1972), or not, is to telephone the parents or guardian to· pick 
up the child. See Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2. It would be fairly simple 
while making this call to determine whether they have approved of the accompanying 
adult as a custodian for their child. For a discussion of one of the drawbacks of 
this approach, see note 188 infra. 
188. One potential problem with this procedure is that, under most ordinances, 
parents are liable for permitting their children to violate curfew, see note 204 infra 
and accompanying text. Since the pUfPOSe of the inquiry is to determine whether 
the child, and thus the parent, has violated the ordinance, there might be fifth 
amendment problems in asking such a question without a Miranda warning, at least 
under the Escobedo "focus of investigation" test, see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 
489 (1964). 
189. One infrequently enacted but very reasonable exception is for the youth in 
front of his own house or adjoining building. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middle-
town, 401 F. Supp. 1242, app. at 1269 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opin-
ion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). Given 
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who are legally employed.190 Typically, the exception allows for 
commuting time and requires certification of the place and hours of 
employment.191 Two types of legitimate activities for which excep-
tions would seem desirable but that are likely to create difficulties 
in enforcement are errands and organized evening activities. Al-
though a parent should be able to send a child to the drugstore at 
10:15 p.m. without risking the child's arrest, a broad exception for 
parental errands might open an excessively large loophole. The 
approach adopted in at least one ordinance is to require written 
authorization, 192 but this does not fit the usual patterns of family be-
havior and would be a trap for the unwary or the illiterate. Rather, 
the legitimacy of the claimed errand, like the authorization of an ac-
companying adult, 193 could be verified when the parents are notified 
of a suspected curfew violation.194 
The other important exception that might create enforcement 
difficulties is that for minors returning from commercial and other 
organized activities. The exceptions should cover commercial ac-
tivities such as movies, concerts, and sporting events, 195 as well as 
activities sponsored by the church -or school, and should allow minors 
one-half hour after completion of the event to return home. To 
the unbearable atmosphere inside a tenement apartment on a hot summer night, it 
scarcely seems wise municipal policy to threaten the arrest of those teenagers who 
seek the relief of their own front stoop. For examples of other typical exceptions 
for legitimate activities, see 401 F. Supp., app. at 1269-71. 
190. See, e.g., People v. Chambers, 66 Ill. 2d 36, 37, 360 N.E.2d 55, 56 (1976); 
Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 420-21, 306 P.2d 601, 602-03 (1957). 
Even the relatively strict Detroit curfew includes this exception. See DETROIT, 
MICH., CITY CoDE § 36-3-5(b) (1976). 
In some circumstances an exception for returning from or going to work would 
be unnecessary since the hours during which a minor is proscribed from working may 
encompass the curfew hours. For example, in Michigan a minor under 16 may not 
be employed between 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., and juveniles 16 to 18 years of age 
may not be employed between 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., except that nonstudents 15 
years old or over may work until 11:30 p.m. MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 409.17-.18 
(1970). 
191. See, e.g., DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE§ 36-3-5(b) (1976). 
192. See City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 795 n.1, 514 P.2d 1059, 
1060 n.1 (1973). 
193. See text at note 188 supra. 
194. By checking with the parent be/ ore the child has an opportunity to speak 
with him or her, the risks of collusion are minimized. However, it is vital that city 
authorities be sensitive to and take precautions against any discrimination by police 
in determining when they believe the minor and when they hold the child pending 
confirmation by the parent. 
195. Several ordinances only provide exceptions for school and church functions, 
with no reference to other social activities. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF PuBLic AF-
FAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, IOWA MODEL ORDINANCES, tit. V, ch. 4, § 4 [hereinafter 
cited as IOWA MODEL ORDINANCES]. It is best, however, to exempt commercial ac-
tivities expressly, even though the police will often make ad hoc exceptions for such 
events. See note 11 supra & notes 207-14 infra and accompanying text. 
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simplify enforcement,196 registration of all noncommercial nocturnal 
activities that minors might be expected to attend could be required.107 
Some ordinances do not exempt such activities as movies but 
instead apply curfew prohibitions not only to such public places as 
streets and parks, but also to moviehouses, bowling alleys, and 
restaurants, holding the proprietor liable for curfew violations.108 
Although prohibiting well-behaved attendance at such places does 
not seem entirely consistent with the purposes of a juvenile curfew, 
certainly enforcement would be complicated if minors were allowed 
to remain in commercial establishments beyond curfew hours and 
given a •half-hour grace period in which to return home. Conse-
quently, the Model Curfew Ordinance suggested by this Note does 
not grant an exemption for minors returning from such establish-
ments, although the Model Ordinance does not extend ,the curfew 
prohibition into the establishments themselves.109 
Finally, although an exception might be made· for juveniles who 
are out alone and tllus not subject to peer pressure to engage in 
criminal activity, proper reflection ~ggests that an ordinance should 
not be limited to minors in groups. Juveniles out alone do risk being 
harmed by others and may be acting in defiance of parental author-
ity. More important, enforcement would be impossible if members 
of a gang could avoid arrest simply by scattering at the sight of a 
police officer. 
Most municipal ordinances do not set out specific sanctions for 
curfew violations, but rely instead on general municipal code provi-
sions regarding ordinance violation. 200 The particular sentences im-
posed for curfew violations are irrelevant if curfews apply only to 
those young enough to come under juvenile court jurisdiction, where 
the sente1,1cing criteria are based on rehabilitation rather than 
the specific crime proved. Some ordinances, such as the Iowa 
196. To be sure, even a carefully written exception for legitimate organized activi-
ties creates difficulties in enforcement and may conflict with the goal of reinforcing 
parental authority. Difficulties can arise in determining whether in fact a particular 
youth actually attended an event or remained until the conclusion. In addition, such 
an exemption might appear to condone juvenile activity beyond the hours individual 
pa!ents set for their children. 
197. Concern has been expressed over the civil liberties implications of such reg-
istration. See Levin Interview, supra note 8. If registration need only list place and 
time and the police have no discretion over granting the exception, these fears would 
seem unfounded. The minimal registration requirement, however, would still prevent 
legitimization of the meetings of juvenile gangs such as the Errol Flynns or B.K.'s 
of Detroit. 
198. See, e.g., DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE §§ 36-3-2, -6 (1976); IowA MODEL 
ORDINANCES, supra note 195, tit. V, ch. 4, § 5. 
199. See the Appendix infra. 
200. E.g., a violation of the Detroit ordinance can be punished by up to a $500 
fine or 90 days imprisonment, or both. DETROIT, MICH., ClTY CODE§ 1-1-7 (1974). 
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model ordinance, impose sanctions only on habitual violators. 201 Al-
though such a· provision reflects the actual enforcement pattern in 
many cities, 202 it should not be built into the ordinance itself, particu-
larly in a large, anonymous municipality. Recent popular criticism 
of the juvenile justice system reflects increasing concern over the 
awareness of juvenile offenders that they can· engage in much unlaw-
ful conduct before any sanctions are imposed. 203 Such enforcement 
certainly should not be written into a curfew ordinance. 
In addition •to sanctions for juvenile offenders, many curfew or-
dinances also provide sanctions for parents or guardians who permit 
their children -to violate the curfew. 204 Such sanctions would in-
crease compliance, since the police cannot apprehend most cur-
few violators. To ensure proper parental assistance, a parent should 
be held responsible for negligent as well as willful violation of the 
ordinance. 205 
III. PATTERNS OF ENFORCEMENT 
As has been indicated, curfew ordinances are not per se uncon-
stitutional, although unnecessarily restrictive provisions may prompt 
a court to invalidate a particular ordinance.206 A pattern of enforce-
ment that is sufficiently violative of constitutional rights, however, 
could lead a court to conclude that the ordinance is unconstitutional 
as applied or could even tip the constitutional balance against the 
ordinance itself. - Two major grounds relied upon by the Supreme 
Court in invalidating vagrancy ordinances have been the high risks 
of discriminatory enforcement and the use of arrests under these or-
dinances to avoid the fourth amendment requirement of probal:,le 
cause for arrest. 201 Information on the enforcement pa,ttern for the 
Detroit curfew reinforces the suspicion that the same problems occur 
in the enforcement of juvenile curfews. 268 
201. low A MODEL ORDINANCES, supra note 195, tit. V, ch. 4, § 6. 
202. See, e.g., Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2. 
203. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Sept. 8, 1975, at 66. 
204. See, e.g., DETROIT, Mice., CITY CODE§ 36-3-7 (1976). 
205. See, e.g., Model Curfew Ordinance in the Appendix infra. Cf. City of East-
lake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212,220 N.E.2d 126 (1966) (overturning a parent's 
conviction under a provision penalizing parents who permit a minor to violate curfew 
"for lack of any proof of scienter"). The proper standard should-be that the parent 
"knew or should have known his child was violating the ordinance." See NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS, MODEL ORDINANCES SERVICE § 7-405 
(1973), making it unlawful for a parent "to suffer or permit or by inefficient control 
allow such violation." 
206. See text at notes 156-205 supra. 
207. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S, 156 (1972). _See also 
text at notes 218-29 infra. 
208. See note 11 supra; Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra note 2. A similar pattern 
of enforcement in Philadelphia is described in Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66, supra 
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Despite an official policy of full enforcement, the Detroit ordi-
nance is not as strictly enforced as a literal reading of the ordinance 
would suggest, 209 and there is no reason to believe that the pattern 
in Detroit is atypical. The lack of full enforcement is not merely 
a result of limited police resources,' however. 210 Instead, police de-
cide not to arrest some people they find violating the ordinance on 
the basis of certain deliberate, though not always articulated, criteria. 
Although some criteria, such as race, are impermissible, 211 many of 
the exceptions likely to be applied informally by the police should 
be perfectly valid, since they often are precisely the exceptions a 
good ordinance would include. The question then becomes whether 
note 16, at 81-87. See also Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 
U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956). 
209. In a letter to the City Council president, then-Police Chief Tannian assured 
that the general orders of the Police Department paralleled the ordinance exactly 
and "clearly requires that all offenders shall be arrested." Tannian Letter, supra 
note 10. In actuality, the police see the ordinance as a "tool," see notes 11Jl2 supra 
and accompanying text; the policeman is expected to use his discretion, and the 
implication is that a well-behaved teenager coming directly home from a movie at 
11 :00 p.m. might be warned that he was violating curfew, but would not be arrested. 
Bill Gray, a columnist for the Detroit News who was concerned about the impact of 
the curfew on attendance at rock concerts at the city-owned Cobo Arena, spoke to 
Commander Richard Dungy of the Special Operations Division. Dungy said that 
"[t]echnically, they [the under-18 patrons at Cobo] are in violation of the ordinance, 
but we're not going to stand at the door after a show and grab them. If they get in 
their cars and go home-directly home-we won't bother them with curfew enforce-
ment. . . . But the same people walking down Woodward after 10 p.m. would be 
subject to the ordinance." He referred to this as a policy of "enforcement with 
discretion." Detroit News, Sept. 22, 1976, at 27A, col. 1. 
A major impetus for the passage of the ordinance, the juvenile gang phenomenon, 
has also been a major focus of its enforcement, Indeed, the police seem to treat the 
ordinance as a means to allow them to break up such gangs after '10:00 p.m. without 
having to wait for a noncurfew crime to be committed. 
210. The effects of less than full enforcement can be taken into account by law-
makers. See Note, Laws That Are Made To Be Broken: Adjusting for Anticipated 
Noncompliance, 15 MICH. L. REV. 687 (1977). 
211. See People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (App. 
Dept. Super. Ct. 1960), in which the court said that a black defendant accused of 
gambling could introduce in defense evidence that the gambling laws were not en-
forced against whites. However, the court stated that "[d]iscriminatory law enforce-
ment, to constitute a want of due process of law, and a denial of the equal protection 
of the laws, must be intentional, and purposeful." 182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 842, 
5 Cal. Rptr. at 855. The use of intentional discrimination on the basis of race, and 
not merely discriminatory effect, as the appropriate criterion for equal protection an-
alysis has been recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp,, 
429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
Police enforcement is more likely to vary depending on the neighborhood in 
which the juvenile is confronted rather than on the race of the suspect. In Detroit, 
for example, curfew arrests would be more common in the heavily black, crime-ridden 
12th Street neighborhood than in the more suburban northwest Detroit area. Dis-
crimination by neighborhood _is not impermissible, however, see San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Salzburg v. Maryland, 346 
U.S. 545 (1954), unless its intent is to discriminate on the basis of race, Griffin v. 
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1964). 
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it is proper to· delegate the authority to formulate those exceptions. 
to the police officers on the beat.212 Such low-level decisionmaking 
can produce inconsistency, since the patterns of enforcement may 
differ from officer to officer. Consequently, the public's knowledge 
of the enforcement criteria will be far more imprecise than for a 
formal law or regulation. 213 In addition, since such decisions are 
made neither by a politically responsive legislature nor by an agency 
required to follow any specified procedure, there is no opportunity 
for public input. Finally, the on-the-street administration of the en-
forcement criteria is essentially invisible to the courts, and thus they 
are deprived of an adequate opportunity to review this conduct. 214 
One solution to such uncontrolled and nonuniform decision-
making by patrolmen might be to impose a requirement of adminis-
trative rulemaking on the police department. 215 A better solution, 
and one that would avoid the issue of excess delegation of authority, 
would be to have the legislative body set out the desired exceptions 
212. Lt. Sherrill of the Detroit Police Department said that police would naturally 
use their discretion in enforcing the Detroit curfew. See Lt. Sherrill Interview, supra 
note 2. Since the Police Chief has committed the Department to full enforcement, 
however, see text at note 10 & note 209 supra, the discretion in the system must occur 
informally and at the lowest level of the police hierarchy. 
213. Cf. The Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l) (1970) ("a 
person may not . . . be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in 
the Federal Register and not so published," unless he has actual notice of it). In 
one sense, of course, no one is adversely affected by a policeman's informal rules 
that narrow the scope of the law. Yet people may rely on the law as it is generally 
enforced and then be arrested for behavior within one of the exceptions that the 
police have made but are not bound to continue to make. · 
The exceptions would be more acceptable if they were simply a reflection of en-
forcement priorities, like the IRS rules of thumb on what triggers an audit, since it 
would defeat the purpose of the unannounced rul~s if people were able to change their 
behavior to fit them. However, curfew exceptions such as that for minors returning 
home from a school play reflect a decision by either the legislature or a patrolman 
that the behavior in question is not within the purposes of the curfew, rather than 
any decision about the allocation of enforcement resources. Reliance on the ex-
ception should not then subject one to the risk of an unchallengeable arrest. 
214. Courts are reluctant even to hear equal protection-based claims that the cri-
teria for enforcement are unconstitutionally discriminatory, since the effect of a de-
cision upholding the claim would be to free one admittedly guilty of violating the 
law. See People v. Fort, 133 Ill. App. 2d 473, 273 N.E.2d 439 (1971); Society of 
Good Neighbors v. Von Antwerp, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W.2d 308 (1949). Courts 
would be still more reluctant to overturn a conviction on a claim that a policeman 
had ignored his normal, nondiscriminatory criteria for making an arrest in order to 
harass a particular defendant, even if that could be proved. See, e.g., Rutkin v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 130, 145-47 (Black, J., dissenting) (use of income tax laws 
as subterfuge for punishment of other crimes). See generally Tieger, Police Discre-
tion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 DUKE L.J. 717; Comment, The Right to 
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 
(1961). But cf. Note, Murguia v. Municipal Court: California Recognizes the De-
fense of Discriminatory Prosecution, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 885 (1976). · 
215. This is the solution to police discretion consistently promoted by Professor 
Kenneth Davis. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); Davis, An Ap-
proach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 703 (1974). 
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in the ordinance itself. 216 The ordinance could then better reflect 
the community's consensus on the degree to which the curfew must 
impinge upon individual liberty. In an abstract sense, such an or-
dinance might be vaguer than a strict curfew without exceptions, but 
it would in fact provide greater notice and predictability than would 
a strict curfew narrowed by the individual patrolman's assessment 
of the appropriate exceptions. 217 
An additional problem of selective enforcement peculiar to cur-
fews and vagrancy ordinances is their common use as a substitute 
for arrest on probable cause:218 a police officer who thinks-but 
does not have probable cause to believe219-that a juvenile has com-
mitted or is about to ·commit a crime might arrest the youth for a 
curfew violation solely in order to have the opportunity to verify his 
suspicion by the common post-arrest investigatory techniques of in-
terrogation, a search of the suspect's person and possessions, and so 
on. As they have done with vagrancy ordinances, courts could in-
validate curfews as one means of avoiding the danger of such pretext 
arrests. This drastic solution seems inappropriate, however, both 
because substantial governmental interests are advanced by curfews 
and because juveniles-the subjects of a curfew-have a weaker 
constitutional interest in freedom of movement than do adults, the sub-
jects of a vagrancy statute. 220 And, under curfew ordinances, un-
like vagrancy ordinances, it is unlikely that most arrests are made 
216. Specification by the legislature is not politically impractical, as exemplified 
by the fact that some of the ordinances considered in the case law contain extensive 
exceptions. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp, 1242, 1269-
71 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 79S 
n.1, 514 P.2d 1059, 1060 n.1 (1973). 
217. To be sure, some courts have overturned curfews, see In re Doe, 54 Hawaii 
647, 513 P.2d 1385 (1973), or parts of curfews, see Bykofsky v. Borough of Middle-
town, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd. by unpublished opinion noted 
in 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (exception for 
"normal ... nighttime activities"), as unconstitutionally vague. Such decisions may 
invite the legislature to turn over the job of refining the law to the police. 
218. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169-71 (1972). See 
generally Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 290-
93 (4th ed. 1974). 
219. On the necessity of probable cause for an arrest, see generally Whitely v, 
Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15-17 (1948), 
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), the court summarily 
dismissed any justification for vagrancy ordinances as a means of "nipping crime in 
the bud." 405 U.S. at 171. Juvenile curfews, however, unlike general vagrancy 
ordinances, are a legitimate tool for preventing young people from falling into a pat-
tern of criminal behavior. See text at notes 132-33 supra. Yet they should not be 
misused as a "cloak for a conviction which could not be obtained on the real but 
undisclosed grounds for the arrest." 405 U.S. at 169. Juveniles, as well as adults, 
have the right to be free from illegal arrests. 
220. See text at notes 92-118 supra. 
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to avoid the probable cause requirement for arrest for more serious 
crimes.221 
It would be desirable, nevertheless, to find some means to deter 
police misuse of juvenile curfews short of invalidating these ordinan-
ces. One alternative would be to prohibit the use of evidence found 
in a search incident to a curfew arrest in any prosecution for another 
crime. This rule, however, would be at once both too broad-since 
many curfew arrests are legitimate-and too narrow, because of the 
peculiar nature of the juvenile court system. The usual juvenile 
court procedure allows the state, in the course of proving a _curfew 
violation, to present evidence related to other suspected crimes222 
for which the state might in fact lack sufficient evidence to convict.223 
The juvenile judge then has complete discretion in selecting the ap-
propriate sentence or "treatment" for the child, 224 which could be 
as severe as would have been imposed for the suspected offense. 225 
A drastic but more effective solution would be to throw out the 
case entirely if the defendant proves that he was the victim of 
a subterfuge arrest. The potential result under this policy might 
seem somewhat paradoxical: juveniles suspected of committing 
more serious offenses would be immune from curfew convictions. 226 
221. The primary focus of a curfew ordinance is against large groups of minors 
wandering aimlessly at late hours, without any necessary connection to another speci-
fic crime. See, e.g., the Preamble to the 1976 Detroit juvenile curfew ordinance 
quoted in note 122 supra. 
Lt. Sherrill of the Detroit Police Department claimed that, since most gang mem-
bers individually are cowards, the scattering of the group caused by enforcement of 
the curfew will reduce the rate of crime committed by gang members. Lt. Sherrill 
Interview, supra note 2. 
222. Cf. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws §§ 712A.17 ("The Court may conduct hearings in 
an informal manner .... "), -.18 (1970) (disposition "shall be appropriate for the 
welfare of said child and society in view of the facts so proven"). Thus, the police-· 
man, in giving evidence to prove curfew violations, could relate the time, place, and 
surrounding circumstances of the event-facts that might well suggest to the judge 
the commission of a more serious crime, such as burglary. 
Some precedent exists for prohibiting the use of evidence found in an illegal 
search from juvenile court adjudications. See State v. Lowry, 95 N.J. Super. 307, 
230 A.2d 907 (1967); In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Sup. Ct.), 
affd., 30 A.D.2d 1051, 295 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1966). Although these decisions are 
limited to arrests for acts that would be criminal if committed by an adult, they are 
still applicable to the present discussion since the issue is not the validity of the arrest 
for curfew violation, but its use as a "disguised" arrest for another crime. 
223. The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings mandated by In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970), is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. . 
224. Usually no fixed sentences are defined by statute in the juvenile justice sys-
tem. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS§ 712A.18 (Supp. 1977). 
225. When a vagrancy ordinance is similarly misused, the adult is, of course, only 
subject to the lesser penalties for the vagrancy conviction. 
226. The parallel between this curfew exclusionary rule and the exclusionary 
rules of the fourth or fifth amendment is somewhat misleading. It is true that, under 
the constitutional rule as well as the curfew rule, convictions of some clearly guilty 
defendants will be voided because of police misconduct, see, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 
152 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:109 
In practice, however, the authorities can avoid this result. This 
policy would require the juvenile to prove that the curfew· arrest was 
illegitimate, which could not be done unless the police and prosecu-
tor attempted to use evidence resulting from the curfew arrest to 
demonstrate that the defendant may have committed another crime.227 
So long as the state used curfew arrests solely as the basis for curfew 
prosecutions, the juvenile who may have also committed a more 
serious offense still could be convicted of curfew violation. 
· In the final analysis, the special enforcement problems inherent 
in curfew legislation can be overcome by a wise legislature and pru-
dent police and prosecutors. A carefully drafted, sensibly adminis-
tered juvenile curfew can make a genuine contribution to the general 
welfare of the community that adopts it. 
430 U.S. 387 (1977), and, as a practical matter, reconviction may be impossible. 
However, the curfew exclusionary rule, unlike the constitutional rule, would deter 
only a special kind of police misconduct-that which is provoked by the suspicion 
that the defendant was guilty of other criminal activity. Thus, those whose convic-
tions would be voided under the curfew rule would not be a random sample of youth-
ful defendants, but-if the police suspicions have any validity-precisely those juve-
niles most in need of juvenile court services: 
227. The proof of whether the arrest was a subterfuge is likely to turn more upon 
the behavior of the prosecutor than the policeman. Since the prosecutor, unlike the 
police officer, does not have to make immediate decisions under tense conditions, this 
rule need not provoke the same controversies over good-faith error that have plagued 
the Miranda and Mapp rules. 
APPENDIX 
Model Curfew Ordinance 
In order to reduce juvenile crime, protect the children of this muni-
cipality, and reinforce parental authority, be it enacted by the city 
of-----
§ 1 It shall be unlawful a for any child under the age of seventeenh 
to be in or upon any public street, highway, park, vacant lot or other 
public place between the hours of 11 :00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 
§2 The following shall constitute valid exceptions to the opera-
tion of the curfew: 
(a) At any time, if the child is accompanied by his or her parent, 
legal guardian, or other responsible person who is over the age of twenty-
one and approved by the child's parent or legal guardian. 
{b) Until the hour of 12:30 a.m., if the child is on an errand as 
directed by his or her parent or legal guardian. 
( c) If the child is legally employed, for the period from one-half 
hour before to one-half hour after work, while going directly between his 
or her home and place of employment. This exception shall also apply if 
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the child is in a public place during curfew hours in the course of his 
or her employment. To come under this exception, the child must be 
carrying a written statement from the employer attesting to the place 
and hours of employment. 
(d) Until the hour of 12:30 a.m., if the child is on the property of 
or the sidewalk directly adjacent to the building in which he or she 
resides or the buildings immediately adjacent thereto. 
( e) If the child is coming directly home from a meeting or a place of 
public entertain.ment, such as a movie, play, or sporting event. This 
exception will 'apply for one-half hour after the completion of such 
event, but in no case beyond 12~30 a.m. If the event is not commercial 
in nature or does not have a fixed. publicly known time at which it 
will end, the sponsoring organization must register the event with the 
Police Department at least 24 hours in advance, informing it of the 
time such event is scheduled to begin, the place at which it shall be 
held, the time at which it shall end, and the name of the sponsoring 
organization. · 
§3 A police officer who has probable cause to believe that a child 
is in violation of this ordinance shall take such child to the police 
station where the child's parents or guardian shall be immediately 
contacted. If after this contact there is still probable cause to believe that 
the child was violating this ordinance, the child shall be held until the 
parent or guardian comes to take the child home. When the parent 
or guardian arrives, he or she must be given a copy of this ordinance. 
If no parent or guardian has arrived within two hours, the child shall 
be turned over to the custody of the juvenile authorities until a parent 
or guardian can take custody of him or her. 
§4 It shall be unlawful for any parent or guardian to permit or 
by inefficient control allow a violation of this ordinance by a child in 
his or her custody or control. A first violation of this section of the 
ordinance shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed $25.00. A second 
or further violation shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed $100.00. 
a The disposition after a finding of guilty will be determined by the section of 
municipal code or state statute dealing generally with disposition of juveniles adjudged 
delinquent. Curfew violations would not, of course, be grounds for transfer to adult 
court. 
b A younger age limit may be used. In no case should the age limit exceed the 
age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction. 
